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―The image of the lone author working in her garret is almost 
wholly obsolete.  Today, most writing (indeed, most creativity of 
all sorts) is collaborative.‖ 
–William Fisher1 
 
A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/ 
volumexxi/book4.  Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive. 
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1
 William Fisher III, Geistiges Eigentum—ein ausufernder Rechtsbereich: Die 
Geschichte des Ideenschutzes in den Vereinigten Staaten [The Growth of Intellectual 
Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States], in EIGENTUM IM 
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―Intellectual (and artistic) progress is possible only if each 
author builds on the work of others.  No one invents even a tiny 
fraction of the ideas that make up our cultural heritage.‖ 
–Judge Easterbrook in Nash v. CBS, Inc.2 
INTRODUCTION 
There is nothing new under the sun, or so the saying goes.  The 
process of creating music is no exception.  The fruit of this 
process, an artistic endeavor, is protected by copyright: an 
intellectual property monopoly created by federal statute to give 
authors certain exclusive rights in and to their creations for a 
certain period of time.
3
  Congressional power to regulate artistic 
and inventive creations flows from the United States Constitution.
4
  
The Constitution directs that Congress regulate copyright and 
patent laws, respectively, to serve human values and social ends by 
promoting creativity and innovation.
5
  However, twenty-first 
century technologies used to create and to disseminate music have 
stressed copyright‘s property-based rights framework beyond its 
fragile limits.  And now copyright law, as applied to music 
generally, and sample-based works specifically, fails to meet this 
constitutional objective.  This failure is made all too clear in the 
case of an intensive sample-based music genre like hip hop. 
For decades hip hop producers have relied on the innovative 
use of existing recordings (most of which are protected by 
copyright) to create completely new works.
6
  Specifically, cuttin‘7 
 
INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 16 (1999) [hereinafter Fisher, The Growth of IP], available 
at http://www.cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf. 
 2 Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 3 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101−06 (2006). 
 4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See infra Part I.B and accompanying notes and text.  For an extensive database of 
songs that have incorporated samples, visit WHO SAMPLED, http://www.whosampled.com 
(last visited July 11, 2011).  
 7 Cuttin‘ contemplates using a cross fader on the turntable mixer to switch back and 
forth from each of the two turntables.  
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and scratchin,‘8 digital sampling,9 looping10 and (most recently) 
mashing
11
 are all methods of creating music and are all integral 
parts of the hip hop music aesthetic.  In fact, collectively these 
creative processes are the hallmark of the type of creativity and 
innovation born out of the hip hop music tradition.
12
  But when 
done without the permission of the borrowed work‘s rights holder, 
they are also at odds with copyright law.
13
  Copyright fails to 
acknowledge the historical role, informal norms and value of 
borrowing, cumulative creation and citation in music. 
Copyright of music protects both the performance embodied in 
the sound recording and the underlying musical composition 
itself.
14
  Artistic works are deemed protectable if they are original 
(meaning independently created and not ―copied‖) and exhibit 
minimal creativity.
15
  However, different copyright infringement 
 
 8 Scratchin‘ is moving the vinyl back and forth against the stylus in different patterns 
and rhythms. 
 9 A sample is the portion of pre-existing sound recordings that producers use to create 
new compositions.  With the exponential growth of technology, this method is now 
commonplace in the hip hop industry.  For a discussion on the sampler and the art of 
sampling see infra Part I.B and accompanying notes and text. 
 10 A ―loop‖ is a piece of sound that can be played again and again in a coherent 
sequence.  Looping occurs when a loop is implemented by the DJ or producer. Loop, 
URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=loop (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2011). 
 11 The process of mashing combines the music of one song with the lyrics of another.  
One famous example is DJ Dangermouse‘s The Grey Album.  The Grey Album is a 
―mashed‖ album that mixed the a cappella tracks from rapper Jay-Z‘s The Black Album 
with instrumentals created from a wide array of unauthorized samples from The Beatles‘ 
The White Album.  See Noah Shachtman, Copyright Enters a Gray Area, WIRED (Feb. 14, 
2004), http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2004/02/62276.  Another 
example is the work of DJ Gregg Gillis, a.k.a. ―Girl Talk.‖ See Phil Freeman, Girl Talk: 
Master of the Mashup, MSN MUSIC (Dec. 6, 2010, 5:15 PM), http://music.msn.com/girl-
talk/interview/feature. 
 12 See Music History: Hip Hop, ICONSCIOUS, http://www.iconscious.co.uk/ 
musichistory/hiphop.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2011) (―Hip-hop epitomizes [the 
reinterpretation of borrowed material].  Not only is music fragmented, flipped, and turned 
into something completely different, but traditional notions of musicality are renovated as 
well.‖). 
 13 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 
2005) (―Get a license or do not sample.‖).  
 14 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114 (2006). 
 15 See infra Part II and accompanying notes and text.  Such a rigid requirement, 
however, is at odds with the collaborative and cumulative process of creating music, an 
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standards are applied to the two types of music copyright in some 
cases.
16
  Additionally, and arguably more troubling, different 
infringement standards are being applied by the circuit courts to 
sound recording infringement cases, resulting in a split in the 
circuits.  The per se infringement rule articulated in the leading hip 
hop digital sampling case, Bridgeport v. Dimension Films,
17
 as 
compared to a recent decision with analogous facts but an opposite 
outcome under a traditional infringement analysis in Saregama 
India Ltd. v. Mosley,
18
 is but one stark example.
19
  Courts in the 
Sixth Circuit apply a per se infringement standard when a 
defendant copies any part of a sound recording.
20
  This Circuit 
continues to value independent creation at any and all cost without 
regard to the role of collaboration and the custom of borrowing in 
the performance of music.
21
  In contrast, courts in the Eleventh 
Circuit consider substantial similarity and the de minimis defense 
which is traditionally applied in sound recording infringement 
cases.
22
  These differences, in turn, have led to unclear judicial 
definitions, distinctions and interpretations for the role of 
substantial similarity and what constitutes a de minimis use, a fair 
use, and a derivative work.  The resulting incongruent decisions 
 
artistic medium generally permissive of borrowing. See generally Olufunmilayo B. 
Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006) [hereinafter Arewa, 
Bach to Hip Hop]; Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation 
and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477 (2007) [hereinafter Arewa, Freedom to Copy] 
(discussing the incomplete nature in copyright doctrine of the theories of creative works 
and the process of creating them). 
 16 See infra Part II.E and accompanying notes and text. 
 17 410 F.3d at 800 (holding that any amount of unauthorized digital sampling 
constitutes per se copyright infringement). 
 18 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–39 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 
798−805). 
 19 See infra Part III.A for a discussion of both cases. 
20  See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800 (―If you cannot pirate the whole sound recording, 
can you ‗lift‘ or ‗sample‘ something less than the whole[?]  Our answer to that question is 
in the negative.‖). 
 21 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy 
and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 281 (2006) [hereinafter Arewa, Catfish 
Row] (―The treatment of musical borrowings under current copyright standards is far too 
often inequitable.‖); see also infra Part III. 
 22 See Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc. 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 
1982)). 
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reflect an inconsistent application of federal law.  This 
inconsistency threatens to diminish both the quality and quantity of 
second-generation cumulative works.  Accordingly, copyright 
law‘s fragmented application is proving troublesome for the music 
industry generally, and for music genres like hip hop in particular. 
As noted by a number of leading intellectual property scholars, 
one of the greatest threats to the Constitution‘s directive to 
promote science and the useful arts is the stifling effect on 
creativity by onerous, overly restrictive copyright laws.
23
  
Accordingly, this Article examines the deleterious impact of 
copyright law on music creation.  It highlights hip hop music as an 
example of a genre significantly and negatively impacted by the 
per se infringement rule applied in some cases to sound recordings 
and by traditional notions of independent creation. 
Ultimately, this Article suggests that music copyright reform is 
needed and, perhaps, inevitable as technology continues to outpace 
and stress the law and the law continues to stress and under-
perform in balancing the rights/access continuum.
24
  Any short- or 
long-term fix should ―sample patent to remix copyright.‖  By this I 
mean copyright reform should contemplate and consider policies 
supporting reverse engineering in the patent context, which 
encourages and values cumulative creation to bolster innovation.
25
  
 
 23 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF 
CREATIVITY (2004); WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009); 
Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).  Note that early cases link copyright with 
―constitutional support of the useful arts.‖  However, twenty-first century scholars and 
cases link ―useful arts‖ to patent law and promotion of ―science‖ to copyright. See 
generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 24 The ―rights/access‖ continuum refers to the balance (or imbalance, as the case may 
be) of protection of a creator‘s rights with the public‘s access to her creation. See 
generally Alina Ng, Rights, Privileges and Access to Information, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
89, 100 (2010) (―[E]conomic growth is dependent not only on the production and 
dissemination of information to society but also on society‘s ability to generate new 
wealth from existing forms of information.‖). 
 25 This Article uses the terms ―creator‖ and ―innovator,‖ ―create‖ and ―innovate,‖ and 
―creation‖ and ―innovation‖ interchangeably.  Despite credible assertions that the 
terminology should not be used in this fashion, I believe such a use furthers the argument 
that patent should be ―sampled‖ to remix copyright.  For a contrary view, see Doris 
Estelle Long, When Worlds Collide: The Uneasy Convergence of Creativity and 
Innovation, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 653, 656−57 (2009). 
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This Article highlights the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act‘s 
sui generis framework by which Congress and the relevant 
industry sought to achieve the ideal balance between exclusive 
rights and access for cumulative creation in a hybrid law of (in 
theory, at least) the ideal components of copyright and patent 
law.
26
 
Part I of this Article chronicles the history of hip hop music 
beginning with its oral tradition that originates in African and 
Jamaican culture to hip hop‘s genesis in the United States in the 
mid-seventies and through its transition into the mainstream.  Part I 
also explores the essential and integral aesthetic value to hip hop 
music of incorporating and looping digital samples of pre-existing 
works to create new songs and the historical role of borrowing in 
music.  Finally, Part I highlights the legal mythologies and realities 
of copyright in the hip hop music community and identifies some 
of the leading proposals in the legal discourse to address the issues 
raised in this Article. 
Part II outlines briefly the history of copyright and the 
development of copyright protection for music.  In particular, Part 
II focuses on copyright protection for the underlying music and 
lyrics (the musical composition), which is separate and distinct 
from protection for the actual performance of that song embodied 
in the master recording (the sound recording).  In general, the 
musical composer initially controls the copyright in the musical 
composition and the recording company controls the sound 
recording.  Two copyrights, one song.
27
 
Part II then discusses the critical role of a substantial similarity 
analysis and the de minimis use and fair use defenses generally 
available to defendants in copyright infringement cases.  Although 
substantial similarity, de minimis and fair use analyses are 
 
 26 I recognize that the resulting legal framework has been criticized for being 
inconsequential to the relevant industry.  Nonetheless, the similarities between the 
concerns in the semiconductor and music industries regarding cumulative creation and 
the legislative response to remedy those concerns by enacting the Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act prove insightful to suggest how Congress might remedy the issues raised 
in this Article. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901−14 
(2006)). 
 27 See infra Part II.E.  
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considered in all cases involving musical compositions, according 
to Bridgeport v. Dimension Films, they are not similarly available 
when infringement of the sound recording is alleged.
28
  Therefore, 
separate infringement standards exist for each copyright 
composition and performance.  Additionally, a circuit split has 
emerged regarding which defenses are available for sound 
recording infringement cases.
29
 
Part III explores the consequences of a fractured music 
copyright regime.  That section identifies the negative 
consequences of applying one infringement standard in music 
copyright cases for the underlying music composition and another 
for an artist‘s actual performance.  Additionally, Part III critiques 
the incongruent treatment of sound recording infringement cases 
among the circuits, highlighting the divergent outcomes in the 
Sixth and Eleventh circuits.  One such consequence, for example, 
is the ―better safe than sorry‖ mindset in securing copyright 
clearances and negotiated licenses.
30
  This type of industry practice 
drastically inflates transaction costs.  It also undermines uses that, 
in other contexts, may actually be deemed fair or may not even rise 
to the level of an unlawful appropriation.
31
 
Finally, Part IV urges courts and ultimately, Congress, to 
consider policies supporting ―reverse engineering‖ in the patent 
law context to serve as a guidepost for how similar policies could 
and should be applied in the copyright context.
32
  Specifically, this 
Part explores the policies and concerns that led Congress to enact 
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (―SCPA‖), a law patterned 
after the Copyright Act that is also one of the only statutes to 
 
 28 410 F.3d 792, 801−02 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 29 See Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–41 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(contrasting the requirement in the Eleventh Circuit to prove substantial similarity with 
the Sixth Circuit‘s exception for sound recordings).  
 30 See Henry Self, Digital Sampling: A Cultural Perspective, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 
347, 358 (2002) (discussing an industry custom that drives users to excessively license 
samples that might not infringe copyright). 
 31 See generally Mickey Hess, Was Foucault a Plagiarist? Hip-Hop Sampling and 
Academic Citation, 23 COMPUTERS & COMPOSITION 280 (2006) (contrasting prohibited 
uses of sound recordings with permissible uses of academic works and finding no rational 
reason for such a distinction).  
 32 See infra Part IV. 
EVANS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2011  3:20 PM 
2011] SAMPLING, LOOPING, AND MASHING 851 
recognize expressly a reverse engineering privilege or defense 
traditionally available only in the patent law context.  Part IV 
posits that acceptance of such policies in sound recording 
copyright reform would encourage greater latitude in the copyright 
law landscape for the type of unauthorized, but innovative and 
aesthetically integral, uses of copyrighted sound recordings and 
cumulative creation for which the hip hop genre has become 
infamous. 
I.  HIP HOP MUSIC: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL MYTHOLOGIES AND 
REALITIES 
A.  History of Hip Hop Music 
―People treat hip hop like an isolated phenomenon.  
They don‘t treat it as a continuum, a history or 
legacy.  And it really is.  And like all mediums or 
movements, it came out of a need.‖33 – Mos Def34 
Mos Def was most definitely correct.  Hip hop has a rich, 
dynamic history and a complex legacy born out of a need for 
collective expression and collective experience by a marginalized 
community dying to be heard.
35
  Similar to other movements 
throughout history, there exists a vast volume of not only cultural, 
media and pop culture artifacts, but also renowned books, movies 
and scholarly works that discuss in-depth the history of hip hop 
culture.  The great majority of this history is outside the scope of 
this Article.
36
  Instead, this Part focuses on the music.  It explores 
 
 33 HIP HOP MATTERS, http://www.allagesmovementproject.org/venues/ 
hip_hop_matters (last visited Aug. 4, 2010). 
 34 Mos Def is an American actor and emcee. See Jason Birchmeier, Mos Def: 
Biography, ALLMUSIC.COM, http://www.allmusic.com/artist/mos-def-p291154/biography 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2011). 
 35 See generally Tricia Rose, Fear of a Black Planet: Rap Music and Black Cultural 
Politics in the 1990s, 60 J. NEGRO EDUC. 276, 289 (1991).  
 36 It would be impossible to sufficiently honor its depth and breadth herein because to 
do so would mean necessarily to involve aspects of politics, crime, misogyny, 
socioeconomics, civil rights, and police brutality.  Although important, those topics are 
not squarely on point. See generally JEFF CHANG, CAN‘T STOP WON‘T STOP: A HISTORY 
OF THE HIP-HOP GENERATION (2007); MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, KNOW WHAT I MEAN? 
REFLECTIONS ON HIP-HOP (2007); NELSON GEORGE, HIP-HOP AMERICA (2005); TRICIA 
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the history of hip hop music to provide context and lays the 
foundation for an analysis of the incongruent and deleterious 
impact of copyright law on music creation. 
1. Hip Hop Culture, Generally 
Hip hop is a ―style of dress, dialect and language, way of 
looking at the world, and an aesthetic that reflects the sensibilities 
of a large population of youth born between 1965 and 1984.‖37  
Hip hop is grounded on four principal elements: Emceeing, disc 
jockeying (―DJing‖), break dancing, and graffiti.38  Emceeing, also 
called ―MCing‖ or ―rapping,‖ is based upon the commonly used 
phrase ―Master of Ceremonies.‖39  It is exhibited generally when 
an individual performs in front of an audience by rhyming, usually 
to the beat of music.
40
  Emceeing is a form of verbal expression 
whose roots are deeply grounded in ―ancient African culture and 
oral tradition.‖41  Despite formal rules of engagement within the 
hip hop culture, as it were, there was one notable exception: no 
―biting.‖  That is, MCs were required to make up their own verses 
 
ROSE, BLACK NOISE (1994); Akilah Folami, From Habermas to ―Get Rich or Die Tryin‖: 
Hip Hop, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the Black Public Sphere, 12 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 235 (2007); andré douglas pond cummings, Thug Life: Hip-Hop’s Curious 
Relationship with Criminal Justice, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 515 (2010); HIP-HOP: 
Beyond Beats & Rhymes (PBS television broadcast Feb. 20, 2007). 
 37 Derrick P. Alridge & James B. Stewart, Introduction: Hip Hop in History: Past, 
Present, and Future, 90 J. AFR. AM. HIST. 190, 190 (2005).  Hip hop operates as 
reflecting the ―social, economic, political, and cultural realities and conditions‖ 
individuals go through and is related to them in an understandable context. Id. 
 38 See Andre L. Smith, Other People’s Property: Hip Hop’s Inherent Clashes with 
Property Laws and Its Ascendance as Global Counter Culture, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
59, 62 (2007). 
 39 See Grandmaster Caz, The MC: Master of Ceremonies to Mic Controller, DAVEY 
D‘S HIP HOP CORNER, http://www.daveyd.com/historyemceegmcaz.html (last visited Apr. 
3, 2011). 
 40 See Smith, supra note 38, at 62. 
 41 Thea Stewart, Exploring the Culture of Hip-Hop 10 (2005) (mini-course developed 
for Graduate Student School Outreach Program, Cornell University), available at 
http://psc.ilr.cornell.edu/gssop/courses/Exploring_Culture_Hip-Hop/2005/Exploring_ 
Culture_Hip-Hop.doc.  Although there is some debate within the hip hop community 
regarding the terms ―rap‖ and ―hip hop,‖ for purposes of this article I use the terms 
interchangeably. 
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or to note specifically in their rhymes that they were using 
another‘s lyrics to either honor or battle them.42 
DJing is the backbone of hip hop, and represents the art of 
cuttin‘ and scratchin‘.  Break dancing involves an acrobatic, 
improvisational and energetic style of dance that includes poppin‘ 
and lockin,‘ head spins, backspins, flips and windmills.43  Finally, 
graffiti is recognized quickly in urban areas by the use of spray 
paint or markers to illustrate the user‘s ―tag‖ or unique mark or 
signature.
44
  Although all of these together compose the culture of 
hip hop, as noted above, this Part and Article will focus 
specifically on emceeing and DJing (which, together, are the 
essence of hip hop music).
45
 
2. The Boogie Down Bronx46 
The birthplace and time of hip hop music is traced back 
generally to the Bronx, New York (a/k/a the ―Boogie Down‖ 
Bronx) and the early 1970s.
47
  However, the oral tradition that 
underpins hip hop music finds its origins in Africa by way of 
Jamaica, home to descendants of West Africa.
48
  The period of hip 
 
 42 See id. at 11 (noting that MCs were required to be original and to rhyme on time 
with the beat).  Thus, even within the hip hop culture, informal norms required ―respect‖ 
for the creative endeavors of other creatives.  This norm endures today. See Amanda 
Webber, Digital Sampling and the Legal Implications of Its Use After Bridgeport, 22 ST. 
JOHN‘S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 373, 379 (2007) (―It is considered a violation of sampling 
ethics for a hip hop producer to sample a recording that has already been used by another 
producer.‖).  
 43 See Smith, supra note 38, at 63.  
 44 See Richard S. Christen, Hip Hop Learning as an Educator of Urban Teenagers, 17 
EDUC. FOUNDS., no.4, Fall  2003, 57–82, available at http://www.graffiti.org/faq/ 
graffiti_edu_christen.html. 
 45 See Smith, supra note 38, at 62. 
 46 The Bronx is the northernmost of the five boroughs of New York City.  The Bronx 
is referred to in hip hop vernacular as ―The Boogie Down Bronx‖ or simply ―The Boogie 
Down‖ and is revered in hip hop culture as the birthplace of hip hop. See 1520 Sedgwick 
Avenue: Birthplace of Hip-Hop—Bronx NY, CINCY STREET DESIGN, 
http://www.cincystreetdesign.com/1520_Sedgwick/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 
2011). 
 47 See Smith, supra note 38, at 63. 
 48 For extensive coverage of the Afro-Jamaican history of hip hop, see generally Self, 
supra note 30, at 348.  
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hop from 1970 to 1986 is known as ―The Roots.‖49  Initially, it 
served as a medium for inner-city youth to gather together at 
parties in their neighborhoods.
50
 
One of the foundational events in hip hop history can be traced 
back to the Bronx.
51
  It is widely accepted within the hip hop 
community that this was where hip hop was born.
52
  On August 11, 
1973, a Jamaican DJ known as Kool Herc, was spinning reggae 
records but not receiving crowd approval (―moving the crowd‖).53  
He finally won them over, however, when he isolated a beat-heavy 
percussion portion of a recognizable R&B tune, and rhymed 
(―rapped‖) over the music simultaneously.54  That defining 
moment sparked an immediate and irreversible reaction that 
formulated the essence of rap music. 
Soon thereafter, Kool Herc‘s friend and a recognized pioneer 
of rap music, DJ Grandmaster Flash, perfected the concept of 
mixing familiar R&B records.  He used classic R&B hits to serve 
as the background to the expressive foreground in which skillful 
rappers could demonstrate their lyrical prowess.
55
  Afrika 
Bambaataa, another DJ from the South Bronx who is regarded 
widely as the founding father of the term ―hip hop,‖ went beyond 
American R&B to incorporate sounds from Caribbean, European 
electro and West African music.
56
  Bambaataa is also noted for 
advancing technological innovation in hip hop music and 
 
 49 See Stewart, supra note 41, at 4. 
 50 See Smith, supra note 38, at 64–68 (providing a substantive chronicle of hip hop‘s 
development and rise to world recognition); see also Hip Hop, The History, 
INDEPENDANCE, http://www.independance.co.uk/hhc_history.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 
2010). 
 51 See Birthplace of Hip Hop, HISTORY DETECTIVES, http://www.pbs.org/opb/ 
historydetectives/investigations/611_hiphop.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).  The 
specific time and place are believed to be August 11, 1973 at 1520 Sedgwick Avenue. Id. 
 52 Davey D, The History of Hip Hop, DAVEY D‘S HIP HOP CORNER, 
http://www.daveyd.com/raptitle.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2010). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See Zack O‘Malley Greenburg, The Man Who Invented Hip Hop, FORBES (July 9, 
2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/09/afrika-bambaataa-hip-hop-music-
business-entertainment-cash-kings-bambaataa.html. 
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furthering musical creativity by implementing the drum machine 
and synthesizer.
57
 
After Kool Herc‘s legendary performance, Grandmaster Flash 
and Afrika Bambaataa began performing shows throughout the 
Bronx, and the term ―hip-hop‖ began to spread throughout the 
African-American community.
58
  Thus, hip hop music gained its 
distinctiveness by building on previously recorded songs; that is, 
by sampling manually.  Much akin to visual collages, sampling is 
viewed within the hip hop community as a musical tapestry.
59
 
In 1975, DJ Grand Wizard accidently discovered the turntable 
―scratch‖ that is now the touchstone of DJing.60  Scratching is a 
technique understood generally to mean physically manipulating 
the vinyl or CD back and forth against the stylus in different 
patterns and rhythms.
61
  The following year, Afrika Bambaataa 
engaged in the first ―DJ battle‖ against Disco King Mario, thus 
starting the legendary ―battle scene‖ among DJs in which DJs 
competed for best audience response.
62
 
Throughout the late 1970s, various rap groups began to emerge 
into the mainstream.  The first known commercial rap song, 
―Rapper‘s Delight‖ by the Sugarhill Gang, was released in 1979 
and reached number thirty-six on Billboard’s Top 100.63  After 
reaching mainstream prominence, the artistry of hip hop began to 
catch on.  DJs, mainly from the Bronx and Harlem, focused 
primarily on cutting and scratching popular dance records to 
 
 57 Nelson George, Hip-Hop’s Founding Fathers Speak the Truth, in THAT‘S THE 
JOINT!: THE HIP-HOP STUDIES READER 50 (Murray Forman & Mark Anthony Neal eds., 
2004). 
 58 See Greenburg, supra note 56. 
 59 The RZA from Wu-Tung Clan explains: ―I‘ve always been into using the sampler 
more like a painter‘s palette than a Xerox.‖ THE RZA, THE WU-TANG MANUAL 192 
(2005). 
 60 Billy Jam, Creator of the Scratch: Grand Wizard Theodore, HIP HOP SLAM, 
http://www.hiphopslam.com/articles/int_grandwizardtheo.html (last visited Aug. 4, 
2010).  Apparently, Grand Wizard Theodore discovered ―scratching‖ when his mother 
was yelling at him to turn down his music and he abruptly moved the vinyl on the 
turntable platter. Id. 
 61 See supra note 8. 
 62 Henry Adaso, Hip-Hop Timeline: 1925–Present, ABOUT.COM, 
http://rap.about.com/od/hiphop101/a/hiphoptimeline.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 
 63 Id. 
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solidify an entirely new genre of music into the industry‘s 
mainstream.
64
  From the mid-1980s through the 1990s, major 
record labels, recognizing the public interest in hip hop, began to 
develop strategies to capitalize on a wealth of new talent and the 
demand of an underexploited market and created ―urban music‖ 
departments.
65
  Now, it can safely be proclaimed that hip hop 
music and culture have permeated not only the culture and 
economy of America but indeed the world.
66
 
B.  Digital Sampling as an Essential and Integral Component to 
Create Hip Hop Music
67
 
The sampler is a tool and a musical instrument. 
That‘s how I always thought about it. . . . [T]he 
sampler is an instrument that I play.
68
 
—The RZA from the Wu Tang Clan 
The sampler is akin to a musical instrument or artistic tool 
despite the fact that it has also been referred to as an instrument or 
tool of theft.
69
  It is essential to the collage-like artistry that 
sampling creates.  The sampler has ingrained aesthetic value to hip 
hop music and, ultimately, to music creation as a whole.  To 
understand the importance and pervasive presence of digital 
sampling in hip hop on a broader scale one need only turn to the 
Billboard charts of the most prominent albums.  In 1989 only eight 
 
 64 Joanna Demers, Sampling the 1970s in Hip-Hop, 22 POPULAR MUSIC 41, 41 (2003).  
The records being scratched mainly focused on soul, funk and R&B, such as Isaac Hayes, 
James Brown, Curtis Mayfield and George Clinton. Id. 
 65 See Unofficial Hip Hop Timeline, B-BOYS.COM, http://www.b-boys.com/classic/ 
hiphoptimeline.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).  
 66 See generally cummings, supra note 36, at 517 (citing Smith, supra note 38, at 68). 
 67 See Self, supra note 30, at 347 (exploring the cultural motivations and cultural, 
artistic and legal impact of digital sampling on the music industry). 
 68 THE RZA, supra note 59, at 190. 
 69 See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).  Judge Duffy begins his famous opinion by citing to the Ten 
Commandments and stating ―Thou shalt not steal.‖ Id. at 183.  The court held that ―[t]he 
conduct of the defendants herein, however, violates not only the Seventh Commandment, 
but also the copyright laws of this country.‖ Id. 
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of the top 100 albums contained samples but by 1999 almost one-
third of the Billboard 100 incorporated samples in some capacity.
70
 
In addition to ushering in a new musical genre, the 1980s also 
ushered in important new technological advancements.  Manual 
cuttin‘ and scratchin‘ was slowly being replaced with digital 
sampling, which consists of copying a portion of one song and 
incorporating it ―into the sonic fabric of a new song‖ by ―playing‖ 
the recorded sounds via a keyboard.
71
  At the height of the mid-
eighties, digital sampling began to advance exponentially.  
Producers sampled any and everything ranging from country to 
heavy metal.
72
  Although the sound of hip hop relied heavily on 
R&B and jazz influences, the ever-evolving ―sound‖ of hip hop 
began to diversify substantially.
73
 
A sampler is the actual digital audio tool used by music 
producers to sample.
74
  It can be either a stand-alone machine or 
software.
75
  It is similar to a synthesizer but instead of generating 
sounds as a synthesizer does, it captures pre-recorded sounds.
76
  
The sounds are captured, saved and then performed via keyboard 
like musical notes.
77
  Although similar to magnetic tape and other 
analog methods of recording, digital sampling permits far greater 
control over the recorded sound and its manipulation.
78
  With 
digital technology, the sampler can isolate and record specific 
instruments within a sound recording, change the tempo, alter the 
 
 70 See John Lindenbaum, Music Sampling and Copyright Law (Apr. 8, 1999) 
(unpublished B.A. thesis, Princeton University) (on file with Center for Arts and Cultural 
Policy Studies, Princeton University), available at http://www.princeton.edu/ 
~artspol/studentpap/undergrad%20thesis1%20JLind.pdf. 
 71 Demers, supra note 64, at 41. 
 72 See Demers, supra note 64, at 41. 
 73 For example, A Tribe Called Quest‘s ―Go Ahead in the Rain‖ sampled Jimi 
Hendrix.  For countless other examples, see supra note 6. 
 74 See Sampler, ANSWERS.COM, http://www.answers.com/topic/sampler-musical-
instrument (last visited Sept. 5, 2010). 
 75 See id. 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermediate Copying, 
Fair Use, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 271, 276 (1996). 
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wave tempo and effectively ―change its sonic characteristics.‖79  
Ultimately, sampled sounds (whether created live or copied from a 
preexisting work) are mixed with other sounds during production.  
Thus, ―the artist can cut and paste sampled sounds into a new 
musical context, either in original or modified form.‖80  Sampled 
sounds run the gamut from highly recognizable to obscure to 
undecipherable fragments of sound.  In the former two cases, the 
source material can be identified by a listener, thus inviting the 
listener to experience the source material in a new way.
81
 
1. Sampler as Musical Instrument 
Far from being just an innovative technological tool, the 
sampler is viewed by hip hop producers as a musical instrument 
and an essential tool of the trade.  Sampled copyright holders, 
however, often view the sampler as a theft device that threatens the 
commercial viability of their intellectual property.
82
  Hip hop 
artists acknowledge this duality, and in many cases even embrace 
it as the type of counter-culture ―Robin Hood-ism‖83 that 
historically has fueled resistance movements of the 
disenfranchised.
84
 
Sampling is certainly not just a hip hop music phenomenon.  
The practice is used widely throughout the music industry.
85
  But 
 
 79 Id. (citing E. Scott Johnson, Protecting Distinctive Sounds: The Challenge of Digital 
Sampling, 2 J.L. & TECH. 273 (1987)). 
 80 Id. at 277. 
 81 Id. at 279. 
 82 THE RZA, supra note 59, at 191.  Even hip hop producers recognize that the sampler 
can be used either as a tool of an artist or of a sluggard: ―A lot of people still don‘t 
recognize the sampler as a musical instrument.  I can see why.  A lot of rap hits over the 
years used the sampler more like a Xerox machine.‖ Id. 
 83 I use the Robin Hood metaphor because most hip hop producers detest paying more 
money to corporate recording companies than to the composers of the music and/or 
lyrics. See Kembrew McLeod, How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop: An Interview with 
Public Enemy’s Chuck D and Hank Shocklee, STAY FREE!, available at 
http://www.alternet.org/module/printversion/18830. 
 84 See Andrew Bartlett, Airshafts, Loudspeakers, and the Hip Hop Sample: Contexts 
and African American Musical Aesthetics, 28 AF. AM. REV. 639 (1994) (noting that rap 
artists and producers began to use the sampler in ―an oppositional manner‖ to oppose 
capitalist notions of property ownership). 
 85 See Tracy L. Reilly, Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 383 (2008) (noting that the practice of sampling is common in 
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the cultural origins and artistic motivations of sampling within the 
hip hop music genre extend to and through New York, Jamaica and 
Africa, making sampling particularly significant to the genre and 
culture.
86
 
Although hip hop music existed long before digital samplers, 
the process of integrating bits of one record with bits of another 
was part of the hip hop aesthetic from its dynamic inception in the 
Bronx.
87
  In fact, is it the very act of borrowing bits of existing 
works in many instances that serves to connect culturally 
identifiable texts to new ones to further strengthen the community 
born of collective memory and collective experience.
88
  The artistic 
process of digital sampling, like the resulting music, is rooted in 
and integrally linked to the African diasporic aesthetic that 
―carefully selects available media, texts, and contexts for 
performance use.‖89  Part of that diasporic experience rests in 
Jamaica, birthplace of the DJ who brought the travelling parties of 
Jamaica to the Bronx.
90
 
The RZA describes his use of the sampler as a ―painter‘s 
palette.‖91  Chuck D uses it to create a collage.92  The point of 
 
creating all forms of music).  ―While African American rap artists have been taking most 
of the heat for unauthorized sampling, artists of other races and musical genres have also 
‗done their share‘ of sampling other artists‘ original material.‖ Id. at 383. See also 
KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF 
DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011). 
 86 See Self, supra note 30, at 347 (exploring the legal implications of sampling in hip 
hop within the context of its cultural roots in New York, Jamaica and Africa). 
 87 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 88 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 16 (―Today, most writing (indeed, 
most creativity of all sorts) is collaborative.‖); see also Arewa, Catfish Row, supra note 
21, at 332 (―Borrowing is often part of what makes cultural texts recognizable to other 
participants in the cultural context from which such texts emerge.  New creations are 
frequently framed in light of and in relation to past experience.‖). 
 89 Bartlett, supra note 84, at 639. 
 90 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 91 See THE RZA, supra note 59, at 192. 
 92 See THE RZA, supra note 59, at 191–92. 
If you take four whole bars that are identifiable, you‘re just biting 
that shit. . . . [O]n every album I tried to make sure that I only have 
twenty to twenty-five percent sampling.  Everything else is going to 
be me putting together a synthesis of sounds. . . . [On one song] it 
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visual art analogies is well made in light of the obvious (and not-
so-obvious, but equally present) distinctions between textual works 
and performance-based and visual works of art.  Hip hop legend 
Chuck D of Public Enemy explained that sampling evolved out of 
a tradition of rappers recording over live bands who were 
emulating sounds from popular music.
93
  So it followed naturally 
that when synthesizers and samplers were introduced, they built on 
and enhanced the integral practice of incorporating popular and 
recognizable sounds so that rappers could still ―do their thing over 
it.‖94  Sampling was not used for expediency or to pass off 
another‘s creativity as one‘s own.  On the contrary, sampling was 
another way of arranging and performing sounds (musical 
notations)—the ―stock in trade‖ of music—in the creative 
process.
95
  During the early stages of hip hop music, producers ran 
wild with the technology without any particular thought for, or 
concern with, the legal repercussions.
96
  Public Enemy emerged 
and distinguished itself as a ―sampling-as-art trailblazer‖ by 
incorporating hundreds of samples into their legendary 1988 
album, It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back.  In an 
ingenious fashion, the group combined the samples in a unique 
way to create a ―new, radical sound that changed the way music 
was created and experienced.‖97  Incidentally, due to the vast 
 
took at least five to seven different records chopped up to make one 
two-bar phrase. 
Id.; see also McLeod, supra note 83. 
 93 See McLeod, supra note 83. 
 94 See McLeod, supra note 83.  Chuck D explained further in his interview with Stay 
Free!: ―Eventually, you had synthesizers and samplers, which would take sounds that 
would then get arranged or looped, so rappers can still do their thing over it.  The 
arrangement of sounds taken from recordings came around 1984 to 1989.‖ Id. 
 95 See McLeod, supra note 83. (―We thought sampling was just another way of 
arranging sounds. Just like a musician would take the sounds off of an instrument and 
arrange them their own particular way.‖). 
 96 See McLeod, supra note 83. ―In the mid- to late 1980s, hip-hop artists had a very 
small window of opportunity to run wild with the newly emerging sampling technologies 
before the record labels and lawyers started paying attention.‖ Id.  The first sound 
recording infringement case did not come until Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner 
Bros. Records Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 97 McLeod, supra note 83. 
EVANS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2011  3:20 PM 
2011] SAMPLING, LOOPING, AND MASHING 861 
number of samples used, it would now likely be cost-prohibitive to 
create It Takes a Nation today due to negotiated licensing fees.
98
 
Hank Shocklee describes the intricate creative process of 
sampling as using the beat as rhythmic building blocks or the 
―skeleton‖ of a track.99  The lyrics (a/k/a ―the rhyme‖) were added 
on top of the beat based on how the lyricist felt, the direction of the 
track and ―what worked.‖100 
Hip hop grew in stature in mainstream music and the number 
of producers who sampled grew accordingly.  But at that time, 
industry practice was to sample first and clear
101
 (if ever) after 
release.
102
  The music industry responded in kind to stamp out 
what it viewed as a hemorrhaging of potential licensing revenue by 
exploiting a new and viable legal claim to bolster its overall claims 
of infringing uses.  As explained more fully in Part III, their new 
legal claim was based on a per se infringement of the sound 
recording. 
Few prominent artists were as negatively impacted by sound 
recording infringement claims as Public Enemy.  The change in 
 
 98 McLeod, supra note 83.  Hank Shocklee noted in the interview that although it 
would not be impossible to create the album at that time, it would be very, very costly. Id.  
The pricing schedule generally included an initial fee with escalations tied to sales 
numbers. Id. 
You could have a buyout—meaning you could purchase the rights to 
sample a sound—for around $1,500.  Then it started creeping up to 
$3,000, $3,500, $5,000, $7,500.  Then they threw in this thing called 
rollover rates.  If your rollover rate is every 100,000 units, then for 
every 100,000 units you sell, you have to pay an additional $7,500.  
A record that sells two million copies would kick that cost up twenty 
times.  Now you‘re looking at one song costing you more than half of 
what you would make on your album. 
Id. 
 99 McLeod, supra note 83. 
 100 McLeod, supra note 83.  Shocklee described how he and Chuck D used sampling as 
an integral part of hip hop artistry: ―Chuck would start writing and trying different ideas 
to see what worked.  Once he got an idea, we would look at it and see where the track 
was going.  Then we would just start adding on whatever it needed, depending on the 
lyrics.‖ Id. 
101  ―Clearing‖ a sample is obtaining copyright permission to use it. See Michael A. 
Aczon, Sampling and Copyright—How to Obtain Permission to Use Samples, ELEC. 
MUSICIAN (Mar. 1, 2002, 12:00 PM), http://emusician.com/tutorials/emusic_clear. 
 102 See McLeod, supra note 83. 
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P.E.‘s musical style between 1988 and 1991 was discernable, and, 
arguably not for the better.  Their ascension to legendary status 
was mostly a result of P.E.‘s ―collage‖ style of music creation.  
The group amassed hundreds of independently unrecognizable pre-
existing sounds (everything from vocal wails to police sirens) and 
used them to create powerful new musical tracks over which they 
delivered political commentary about issues of race, racism, 
economics, violence, police brutality and religion.
103
 
Two primary reasons explain why collage-style sampling was 
so negatively impacted.  First, the cost to secure copyright 
clearances on hundreds of aural fragments quickly became 
exorbitant.  Second, samples of pre-existing sounds create a 
―purer‖ sound than re-creating the sound in the studio with live 
musicians due to master recording composition rates.
104
 
Shocklee provides a somewhat less technical explanation of the 
difference as being the difference between hitting someone ―upside 
the head‖ with a pillow versus a piece of wood.105  The result?  
Now most producers generally sample and loop only one song so 
that there is only one or there are very few copyright holders 
involved in calling the shots rather than, conceivably, hundreds.
106
  
So for now it seems the highly artistic and innovative concept of 
the P.E.-style collage created with musical rather than notational 
 
 103 McLeod, supra note 83.  When asked how the threat of litigation impacted the P.E. 
sound, Chuck D replied: 
Public Enemy‘s music was affected more than anybody‘s because we 
were taking thousands of sounds.  If you separated the sounds, they 
wouldn‘t have been anything—they were unrecognizable.  The 
sounds were all collaged together to make a sonic wall.  Public 
Enemy was affected because it is too expensive to defend against a 
claim.  So we had to change our whole style, the style of It Takes a 
Nation and Fear of a Black Planet, by 1991. 
Id.  
 104 This second reason is somewhat technical.  The composition rates in a sampled 
sound are significantly higher and, therefore, of a better quality, than the same sound (an 
organic sound) created by live in-studio musicians.  For a plain-English explanation of 
digital sampling rates and digitizing sound see Sound Sampling, FRIENDS OF ED, 
http://www.friendsofed.com/errata/1590593030/SoundSampling.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 
2010). 
 105 McLeod, supra note 83. 
 106 McLeod, supra note 83. 
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composition is dead.
107
  The effect of per se sound recording 
infringement and negotiated licenses seems to have, in effect, 
thwarted the very creativity and artistry the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the Constitution sought to promote.  
2. The Essential Role of Borrowing in Music 
The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression.
108
  However, both traditional 
and current concepts of copyright are premised on a paradigm that 
presumes borrowing is generally antithetical to creativity and 
innovation and that creative works worthy of protection are always 
created independently.
109
  This presumption, beyond being largely 
unsubstantiated, actually has an onerous impact on musicians who 
historically have used collaboration and borrowing regularly in the 
creative process.
110
  Additionally, this unsupported presumption 
has disregarded the importance of copying in the creative process 
and has left its value ―under-appreciated and under-theorized in 
copyright doctrine . . . .‖111 
This assertion is well illustrated by the real and burgeoning 
impact copyright creation requirements have had on hip hop music, 
the producers of which regularly use sampling, looping and 
 
 107 See Bartlett, supra note 84, at 640 (describing musical composition, as opposed to 
the traditional European practice of notational composition, as the central focus of hip 
hop).  
 108 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 109 See Arewa, Bach to Hip Hop, supra note 15, at 585 (―Current conceptions of 
authorship assume a dichotomy between copying and creativity and presume that 
borrowing is inimical to creativity and innovation. . . . [S]uch views of musical 
authorship fail to recognize that the use of existing works for new creations can be an 
important source of innovation.‖). 
 110 See Arewa, Bach to Hip Hop, supra note 15, at 586; see also Arewa, Freedom to 
Copy, supra note 15, at 523 (noting that borrowing is an important part of creating many 
cultural productions, including music).  Professor Arewa identifies terms used regularly 
in musicology to illustrate the point: ―[T]erms used to discuss relationships between 
musical texts include borrowing, self-borrowing, transformative imitation, quotation, 
allusion, homage, modeling, emulation, recomposition, influence, paraphrase, and 
indebtedness.‖ Id. 
 111 Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 482 (citing Julie E. Cohen, Creativity 
and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2007) (other 
citations omitted)).  Professor Arewa notes further that ―in legal discourse, the creative 
significance of copying and uses of existing works is often ignored.‖ Id. 
EVANS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2011  3:20 PM 
864 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:843 
mashing as artistic tools to create a novel tapestry of music from 
existing bits of copyrighted works.  From the perspective of the 
Copyright Act, the sampling artist is expected to license the right 
to use the copyrighted work (which requires obtaining the rights to 
both the musical composition and the sound recording) and to pay 
licensing fees.  But the nature of music in general (hip-hop in 
particular) as collaborative and generally involving borrowing on 
the one hand, and the exclusive rights in a copyright holder to, 
among other things, copy and create adaptations from the original 
on the other, places this type of artistic innovation at odds with 
copyright law.  Because of the historical relevance of borrowing 
which has permeated music throughout history, current copyright 
laws should be revised to reflect, encourage and protect such 
uses.
112
 
Additionally, the policies underlying the existence and 
development of copyright law in the United States must be 
realigned with its constitutional underpinnings to focus on more 
than providing incentives for creation and innovation.  Copyright 
policy must seek to balance an author‘s exclusive rights with the 
realities of how creative works are produced to foster the ideal 
conditions for, and access by second-comers to, creativity.  If the 
fundamental goal of intellectual property laws is truly to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts then current copyright law 
lags behind its constitutional call and therefore fails to serve this 
fundamental goal.
113
 
3. Legal Mythologies and Realities in Hip Hop 
I assert the relationship between hip hop music producers, the 
artistic practice of sampling and the resulting legal implications 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
 112  See Arewa, Bach to Hip Hop, supra note 15, at 547 (―The pervasive nature of 
borrowing in music suggests that more careful consideration needs to be given to the 
extent to which copying and borrowing have been, and can be, a source of innovation 
within music.‖).  
 113 See Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright, Creativity, Catalogs: Commentary: Copyright and 
the Human Condition, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1233, 1244 (2007) (―If copyright is to 
promote creativity, it will not be well served by rigid control over the ability to access 
and use cultural goods.‖). 
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1. They didn‘t think it was a problem. 
2. Then it became a problem, which was a problem. 
3. Then they did it knowing it was a problem. 
4. Now they don‘t do it for fear of a problem. 
5. Courts don‘t agree on how to assess whether the practice is a 
problem. 
6. This is a problem. 
a)  Industry-Created Response 
The industry response to this ―problem‖ is to secure a rights 
holder‘s permission by negotiating copyright licenses.114  This 
copyright clearance process is often left to the musician or 
producer rather than the record label and in many cases a third-
party company is retained to handle the actual mechanics of the 
process.
115
  Copyright clearance involves securing permission both 
from the composer or composers who control(s) rights in the 
musical composition and from the entity or entities that own(s) 
rights in the sound recording.
116
  Because there is no agreement 
within the industry on actual standards and valuation, several 
factors are considered in each negotiation to determine these 
issues.  These factors include the stature of the sampling and 
sampled artists, the success of the sampled song, the intended use, 
the duration and content of the sample (hook versus a beat, for 
example), and the number of times the sample is looped in the 
resulting track.
117
 
This results in wide ranging and, at times, excessive licensing 
fees which diminish both the quantity and creative uses of 
sampling.  In response to the limitations of the current system, 
numerous commentators have suggested varied and various short- 
and long-term remedies.  The most commonly proposed suggestion 
is for Congress to create a compulsory licensing framework that 
 
 114 See Szymanski, supra note 78, at 290. 
 115 See Szymanski, supra note 78, at 290–91. 
 116 See JARED HUBER & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33631, COPYRIGHT 
LICENSING IN MUSIC DISTRIBUTION, REPRODUCTION, AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCE 1 (2006), 
available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/RL33631_060830.pdf. 
 117 See Szymanski, supra note 78, at 291. 
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encompasses a liability-based (instead of property-based) rule, as 
noted herein below. 
b) Alternative Approaches 
Property rights are described generally as a bundle of rights.
118
  
It is often stated the most essential stick in the bundle is the 
property owner‘s right to exclude.119  But this concept does not fit 
neatly within the intellectual property rubric.  The latter, a creature 
of legislative action, is a privilege-based monopoly granted for 
limited times.  The former is often discussed as having the 
potential to last in perpetuity.  However, copyright as applied to 
the creation and dissemination of new musical works operates as a 
property rule.
120
 
Although traditional property law remedies seek in most 
circumstances to enjoin behavior antithetical to a property owner‘s 
interests, intellectual property owners should, in theory, receive 
liability-based remedies only substantial enough to offer protection 
while maintaining the delicate balance between private interest and 
the public benefit of encouraging further innovation.
121
  But in 
recent years, courts have interpreted copyright law in ways more 
consistent with a property rule (I can exclude anyone for any 
reason) than a liability-based rule (you can use as long as you pay).  
This shift is referred to as the ―propertization‖ of intellectual 
property.
122
  Essentially, the right to control the use and 
 
 118 J.E. Penner, The ―Bundle of Rights‖ Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 
712 (1996). 
 119 Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property Rules or Liability Rules 
Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 783 (2007) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979)).  
 120 See Arewa, Bach to Hip Hop, supra note 15, at 638 (―[T]he current copyright 
system operates under a property rule theory, in which nonconsensual takings are 
discouraged.‖ (citing Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 704 (1996))). 
 121 See Arewa, Bach to Hip Hop, supra note 15, at 638. 
 122 Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 2–3 (noting that in the eighteenth century, 
lawyers and politicians were more apt to refer to copyright and patent as monopolies, not 
property). 
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dissemination of information became forms of property and were 
thus referred to and considered property in the traditional sense.
123
 
A number of alternatives—from the entirely academic to the 
entirely plausible—have been presented in the last two decades to 
remedy the sampling dilemma.  One commentator identifies 
certain unauthorized uses that constitute actionable ―substantial‖ 
copying and suggests a coordination of the de minimis doctrine.
124
  
Another scholar offers a ―freedom to copy‖ legislative framework 
premised on liability-based rather than property-based rights.
125
  
That author posits that a ―freedom to copy‖ framework would 
disaggregate compensation and control rights to allow borrowing, 
copying and other uses of pre-existing copyrighted works for all 
but unfair uses.
126
  Further, the author argues that such a 
framework best achieves the balance between protecting individual 
rights—especially those based on existing works—and promoting 
new creativity.
127
  She and other commentators make a credible 
case for why ex-post determinations of liability may actually 
encourage the creation of new works, especially in the case of 
musical works where creation is often normatively cumulative.
128
 
 
 123 Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 2–3.  The discourse switched to ―one 
centered on the notion that rights to control the use and dissemination of information are 
forms of ‗property.‘‖ Id.  From the perspective of a legal realist, words matter because 
they have the power through legal discourse to shape perceptions and can drive 
outcomes.  Legal realism rests on the notion that law is indeterminate.  Such 
indeterminacy creates an environment in which judges assume considerable discretion 
and latitude in assessing meaning and value to the underlying matter in questions and the 
litigants involved therein.  In the case of hip hop music and its use of sampling, the 
concern is whether judges like the panel in Bridgeport find it easy to declare an otherwise 
innovative use to be unlawful and unworthy of protection. Smith, supra note 38, at 83–
84. 
 124 Reuven Ashtar, Theft, Transformation, and the Need of the Immaterial: A Proposal 
for a Fair Use Digital Sampling Regime, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 261, 264 (2008). 
 125 Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 553. 
 126 Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 553.  Professor Arewa explains that 
unfair use can be analogized to unfair trade (which promotes fair trade) and unfair 
competition (which promotes fair competition). Id.  In those areas of law, ―unfair‖ is used 
to delineate ―what constitutes fair practices.‖ Id. at 553 (citing Hale E. Sheppard, The 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd Amendment): A Defeat Before the 
WTO May Constitute an Overall Victory for U.S. Trade, 10 TUL. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 
121, 121–22 (2002) (other citations omitted)).  
 127 Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 552. 
 128 Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 552–53. 
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Other scholars suggest varied approaches to a compulsory 
licensing scheme.  The general assumption shared by most 
proponents is that compulsory licensing will help to offset the 
effects of overly restrictive copyright laws that threaten creative 
processes involving borrowing and other modes of cumulative 
creativity.
129
  Compulsory licensing is not without its critics, 
however.
130
  Nonetheless, a credible case exists for a compulsory 
sample-licensing scheme complemented by a robust transformative 
fair use standard.  A key benefit of a liability-based rule is that 
such frameworks ―have the potential to significantly reduce 
transaction costs in copyright by reducing the extent to which 
permissions are needed from existing copyright owners.‖131 
The fact that so many commentators have suggested and 
indeed implored Congress to act in this regard, without any 
corresponding legislative action, suggests that although the issue is 
reaching a boiling point in legal discourse, the music industry and 
the courts, Congress has yet to begin even the nascent stages of 
reform.  And to say Congress has been reluctant to sanction such 
legislation is, without question, an understatement, especially 
given its hands-off approach to copyright reform historically.
132
 
 
 129 Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 552–53 (noting that compulsory 
licensing schemes can mitigate the economic side effects of intellectual property 
systems); see also William Fisher III, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, 
Empirical, and Historical Perspectives, in INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION, AND THE 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, BELEIDSSTUDIES TECHNOLOGIE ECONOMIE 37 (2001) 
[hereinafter Fisher, IP & Innovation], available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf.  Professor Fisher‘s paper examines the pros, cons and 
alternatives for compulsory licensing and concludes that the benefits outweigh the 
associated concerns.  Additionally, it outlines an insightful empirical analysis of 
implementing a compulsory licensing scheme by comparing the effect of compulsory 
fees to profit-maximizing price in pharmaceutical sales during the term of patent 
protection. Id. 
 130 See Ed Felton, Compulsory Licensing: Responses, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Oct. 23, 
2002, 12:30 PM), http://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/compulsory-licensing-
responses. 
 131 Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 554 (citing Chris Johnstone, 
Underground Appeal: A Sample of the Chronic Questions in Copyright Law Pertaining 
to the Transformative Use of Digital Music in a Civil Society, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 
424 (2004)).  
 132 See infra notes 206–213 and accompanying text. 
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 Congress must revisit this issue to clarify and reconcile the 
varied approaches to this critical topic and to ensure that it fashions 
a rule that protects copyright holders, preserves traditional 
defenses to copyright infringement and encourages innovative uses 
of technology to create new works from existing creative 
artifacts.
133
 
II. COPYRIGHT: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL MYTHOLOGIES AND 
REALITIES 
A.  Brief History of Copyright Law 
Today the United States outpaces other nations as the leading 
proponent of strengthened intellectual property rights in America 
and throughout the world.
134
  The United States took an undeniably 
hard-lined approach in its negotiations of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property treaty (―TRIPS‖)135 in the 
Uruguay Round in urging the adoption of its version of copyright 
and patent revisions.
136
  In addition, serious and substantial 
concerns about wholesale piracy believed to be occurring in China 
lead the United States to respond more aggressively to those 
infringement concerns than to China‘s human rights violations.137 
 
 133 See infra Part II.C. 
 134 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 11 (citing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, 
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 3 
(1996)). 
 135  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  The World Trade 
Organization‘s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
negotiated in the 1986–94 Uruguay Round, introduced intellectual property rules into the 
multilateral trading system for the first time. See generally Intellectual Property: 
Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/ agrm7_e.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
 136 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Jerome H. Reichman, 
Intellectual Property in International Trade and the GATT, in EXPORTING OUR 
TECHNOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AND TRANSFERS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATIONS 
3 (Mistrale Goudreau et al. eds., 1995)). 
 137 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) 
Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 1293, 1297–98 (1996)). 
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But the United States has not always been so zealous in its 
protection of intellectual property interests.  From the early to mid-
nineteenth century, the United States offered limited protections of 
domestic literary works and had little if any regard for piracy 
claims of foreign copyright holders alleged to occur within the 
country.
138
  From the mid-twentieth century until today, however, 
the confluence of economic, ideological and political factors has 
compelled Congress to extend and expand the nature, scope and 
duration of the copyright monopoly far beyond ―exclusive rights‖ 
to authors and inventors for ―limited times.‖139  This is clearly 
evident in the extension of the duration of copyright—now lasting 
for the life of the author plus seventy years after the author‘s 
death.
140
  The point is also evident in the expansion of types of 
works protected by copyright.
141
  Additionally, the legal discourse 
has changed the perception of copyright from monopoly to 
property right.
142
  Accordingly, the United States has ―transformed 
from the most notorious pirate to the most dreadful police.‖143 
 
 138 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 2–3 (noting that until the middle of 
the nineteenth century copyright protection was limited to ―verbatim copying of his or 
her language‖); id. at 11 (noting Charles Dickens‘ concerns that American publishers 
were reprinting his works without permission). 
 139 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 10.   
Copyright has been expanded and extended within the last decade. 
Legal changes have increased the scope of protection (for example, 
the Copyright Act of 1976 formally conferred power over derivative 
works), lengthened its duration (the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act (CTEA) of 1998 increased it by twenty years), 
prohibited users from circumventing technical restrictions on using 
works (for example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act forbids 
bypassing access control measures), reduced fair use‘s scope, 
increased civil and criminal penalties for infringement, and allowed 
license agreements to override countervailing rights and defenses 
such as fair use (for example, court decisions uphold license 
agreements banning reverse engineering even when it would be fair 
use). 
Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the Grey Album, 59 ALA. 
L. REV. 345, 352 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 140 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
 141 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 3–4 (noting the additions of 
photographs, sound recordings, software and architectural works). 
 142 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031, 1033–46 (2005) (noting the change in intellectual property discourse to 
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Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution empowers 
Congress ―To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖144  The first 
national bill to establish copyright law in the United States was 
passed by Congress in 1790 and signed into law by George 
Washington on May 31, 1790 ―for the encouragement of learning, 
by securing the copies of maps, Charts, And books, to the authors 
and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein 
mentioned.‖145  Its English precursor, The Statute of Anne, took 
effect in 1710 and is viewed as the first modern copyright 
statute.
146
  It granted ―authors or their assigns‖ the exclusive right 
 
reflect real property rights discourse); see also Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, 
at 499 (arguing that the ―propertization approaches‖ are directly related to increased 
intellectual property protection in recent years); Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, 
at 20–23 (noting trend in intellectual property discourse to ―propertize‖ copyright, patent 
and trademark). 
 143 Michael Fuerch, Dreadful Policing: Are the Semiconductor Industry Giants Content 
with Yesterday’s International Protection for Integrated Circuits?, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 
6, 23 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Peter K. Yu, The Copyright 
Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 353 (2003)).  Fuerch explains that after being a 
notorious pirate of British novels in the nineteenth century, the United States emerged 
with its own cultural identity and ―began to push for and implement greater international 
intellectual property protection.‖ Id. 
 144 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).  Interestingly, an earlier draft of this 
clause empowered Congress: 
To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time; To 
encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of 
useful knowledge and discoveries; To grant patents for useful 
inventions; To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time; 
and To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the 
promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures. 
Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 14 n.69 (citing Edward C. Walterscheid, To 
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 
44–45 (1994)).  Walterscheid opines that this language was not passed upon for 
ideological reasons but because it was too costly to implement. Id. at 14–15 (citing 
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The 
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 44–45 (1994)). 
 145 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, pmbl., 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831). 
 146 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c.19 (Eng.). 
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to publish books for fourteen years from the date of publication.
147
  
Both focused on written works and wholesale copying.
148
  
Congress has since made several substantial revisions to the law, 
including expanding the class of protected works to include limited 
rights in sound recordings via the Sound Recording Act of  
1971.
149
 
B. Rights of the Copyright Holder 
Copyright exists automatically when a work is fixed for the 
first time in any tangible medium of expression
150
 in a copy
151
 or 
phonorecord.
152
  ―By ‗copy‘ the Act means material objects—such 
as books, manuscripts, electronic files, Web sites, e-mail, sheet 
music, musical scores, film, videotape, or microfilm—from which 
a work can be read or visually perceived either directly or with the 
 
 147 Id.  The term of protection was extended for an additional fourteen years if the 
author were still living upon expiration of the first term. See id. 
 148 See generally Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831); Statute of 
Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c.19 (Eng.). 
 149 Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). See infra Part II.D.; see also Lucille M. Ponte, The 
Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling Infringement Cases are Exposing 
Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the Need for Statutory Reform, 43 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 515, 525 (2006) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2004)) (―[T]he rights in a sound 
recording are much more limited than those provided for other copyrighted works, 
including musical scores.‖).  
 150 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 151 The Copyright Act defines ―copies‖ as: 
[M]aterial objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed 
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the 
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.  The term 
―copies‖ includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in 
which the work is first fixed. 
Id. § 101. 
 152 The Copyright Act defines ―phonorecords‖ as:  
[M]aterial objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method 
now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.  The term ―phonorecords‖ 
includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.  
Id. § 101. 
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aid of a machine or device.‖153  Phonorecords are material 
objects—such as CDs or LPs.154  ―Thus, for example, a song (the 
work) can be fixed in sheet music (copies) or in a CD 
(phonorecord) or both.‖155  This distinction is important because 
sound recordings (an artist‘s actual performance on the CD) and 
the underlying musical compositions (the music and lyrics) are 
considered separate works with separate and distinct copyrights.
156
 
In general, the Copyright Act gives a copyright owner the 
exclusive right to do and to authorize others to reproduce the work, 
prepare derivative works based on the original, distribute copies of 
the work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending, perform the work publicly, display the 
work publicly, and in the case of sound recordings, to perform the 
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
157
  
Collectively, these rights are often referred to as a copyright 
holder‘s exclusive bundle of rights.158  These exclusive rights, 
however, do not include any right of public performance.
159
  
Essentially, this means a band can cover a song and pay 
compulsory royalties to the composer (or her publishing 
designee).
160
  Accordingly, the protection afforded sound 
 
 153 TONYA M. EVANS, COPYRIGHT COMPANION FOR WRITERS 11 (2007). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 n.3 (6th Cir. 
2005) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7)); see also Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 
1244, 1248–49 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7)). 
 157 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6). 
 158 For works created on or after January 1, 1978, copyright generally lasts for the life 
of the author plus seventy years after the author‘s death. Id. § 302(a).  Interestingly, the 
right to ―use‖ is not among the bundle of rights. Id. § 106.  This highlights an important 
issue in copyright in the twenty-first century as users assert greater interests in access to 
copyrighted works, with or without permission.  
 159 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a).  ―The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound 
recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly recapture the 
actual sounds fixed in the recording.‖ Id. § 114(b).  Additionally ―[t]he exclusive right of 
the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to 
the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound 
recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality.‖ Id. 
 160 ―The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording . . . do not 
extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of 
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recordings in digital sampling cases only extends to ―the recorded 
sound—the stored electronic data digitally preserved by the 
composer.‖161  If the exact sounds are re-created independently in 
another recording (i.e., ―covered‖), that recording is considered an 
independent creation.
162
  This holds true ―even though sounds 
imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.‖163  
The notion of independent creation has been long established in 
case law
164
 and questioned extensively in the legal discourse.
165
 
C. Infringement Analysis: Substantial Similarity 
Infringement occurs when someone—without right, permission 
or legal defense—exploits one or more of the exclusive rights of 
the copyright owner.  There are several methods and varied 
terminology used among the circuits to assess infringement.
166
  
However, all contemplate the same basic analysis.  To prove 
copyright infringement a copyright holder must establish that she 
owns a valid copyright,
167
 the infringing party actually copied the 
copyright owner‘s work (proved either directly or circumstantially 
via an intrinsic ―substantial similarity‖ analysis);168 and that such 
 
an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate 
those in the copyrighted sounds recording.‖ Id. (emphasis added).  
 161 Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 248 F.R.D. 507, 527–28 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (finding 
that artist DMX‘s incorporation of a portion of plaintiffs‘ copyrighted beat, ―ESS Beats‖ 
in his song, ―Shot Down‖ (featuring 50 Cent and Styles) did not constitute an 
infringement of a sound recording because plaintiffs could not establish, and therefore a 
reasonable jury could not conclude, that defendants actually sampled). 
 162 17 U.S.C. § 114(b). 
 163 Fharmacy, 248 F.R.D. at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799–800 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
 164 See generally Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903) 
(citing Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 765 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1,580) (―Others are 
free to copy the original.  They are not free to copy the copy.‖). 
 165 See generally Arewa, Bach to Hip Hop, supra note 15, at 550–51.  Professor Arewa 
notes that copyright legal structures and classical music canons have both ―relied on a 
common vision of musical authorship that embeds Romantic author assumptions‖ and 
views creation as ―autonomous, independent and in some cases even reflecting genius.‖  
Id. 
 166 Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 484.  
 167 See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 168 See Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 485–86  (citing Computer Assocs. 
Int‘l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 557–58 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)) (noting that in the 
absence of direct evidence—an admission, for example—copying is often proven 
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copying amounts to an unlawful appropriation.
169
  A finding of 
unlawful appropriation is required because not all instances of 
unauthorized copying rise to the level of an actionable 
appropriation.
170
 
The notion that trivial uses of a protected work, though 
unauthorized, will not be deemed an infringing use in every case is 
well established in copyright jurisprudence.
171
  Allowing for trivial 
uses reflects the familiar legal maxim de minimis non curat lex 
understood to mean ―the law does not concern itself with 
trifles.‖172  Thus, de minimis use and intrinsic substantial similarity 
are inextricably linked and often overlap.
173
 
In the case of sampling, however, copying in fact is rarely 
litigated.  The question is seldom whether a defendant copied a 
sound recording; the process of sampling necessarily entails 
making a direct copy.  The question is whether the use was de 
minimis or fair, unless of course the jurisdiction applies a per se 
infringement analysis as did the court in Bridgeport.  Thus, digital 
 
circumstantially).  ―Establishing copying also involves assessment of the degree of 
substantial or probative similarity between the two works, which constitutes the second 
aspect of the copying element.‖ Id.  Proving ―copying in fact‖ is often referred to as 
involving ―extrinsic substantial similarity.‖ Id. 
 169 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Ringgold 
v. Black Entm‘t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74–75 (2d Cir. 1997)), cert. denied, 545 
U.S. 1114 (2005).  The test used to determine whether an appropriation was unlawful 
appropriation is a subjective one referred to as ―intrinsic substantial similarity.‖ See 
Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 486–87. 
 170 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1192–93 (―[E]ven where the fact of copying is conceded, no 
legal consequences will follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.‖) 
(citations omitted); see also Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 480 (citing 
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946)) (―The term copying is often 
taken to be the equivalent of infringement, but it may also be used to describe practices 
connected to the creation of new works, including borrowing practices in varied creative 
fields.‖). 
 171 See West Publ‘g Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 
1909) (―Even where there is some copying, that fact is not conclusive of infringement.  
Some copying is permitted.  In addition to copying, it must be shown that this has been 
done to an unfair extent.‖). 
 172 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193 (citing Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74–75). 
 173 Id.  Additionally, substantial similarity tests are used both to establish copying in 
fact circumstantially and also in proving improper appropriation. Id. 
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sampling cases generally focus on unlawful appropriation.
174
  
Generally courts analyze ―substantial similarity‖ by examining the 
―total concept and feel‖ of the copied and resulting works and 
determining ―whether there is substantial similarity between the 
allegedly offending works and the protectable, original elements‖ 
of the sound recording.
175
 
D. Affirmative Defenses in Infringement Cases 
Once a copyright owner has met her burden to establish a 
prima facie case of infringement, the alleged infringer may assert 
affirmative defenses.  These defenses include, but are not limited 
to, fair and de minimis uses, as well as estoppel, laches, misuse, 
innocent intent, and abandonment.
176
  The defenses most relevant 
to this Article are those frequently asserted in sound recording 
infringement cases: de minimis use and fair use. 
1. De Minimis Use 
De minimis copying consists of ―copying that is so trivial and 
insignificant that no liability can result . . . .‖177  Generally, in 
determining whether copying constitutes de minimis copying 
courts will consider the amount copied and the importance of what 
is copied in the alleged infringer‘s work.178  This doctrine is 
important in the context of sampling in the music industry.  Cases 
applying the de minimis doctrine do not set forth with any 
particular certainty where to draw the line between unauthorized 
use which is permissible or what quantum of similarity crosses the 
threshold of substantial similarity.
179
 
 
 174 Ponte, supra note 149, at 527 (―[Unlawful appropriation] is at the heart of the 
difficulties with applying standard copyright principles to digital sampling disputes.‖). 
 175 Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(quoting Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int‘l, 533 
F.3d 1287, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
 176 See generally MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 487 (5th 
ed. 2010). 
 177 Id. at 430. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 431.  
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2. Fair Use 
If a court finds a defendant‘s copying to be more than de 
minimis, the defendant may nevertheless defend her use on fair use 
grounds.  The fair use doctrine originated as a judicially created 
defense to copyright infringement.
180
  The doctrine allows a third 
party to use a copyrighted work without the copyright owner‘s 
consent for certain purposes and under certain conditions.  Fair use 
is determined on a case-by-case basis.
181
  It was conceived 
originally to apply to textual works.
182
  The fair use doctrine was 
crafted to create and to preserve enough creative ―space‖ for a 
second author to copy a prior author‘s work within the context of 
protecting an original author‘s copyright monopoly.183  However, 
the subject matter of copyright has expanded over time to include 
works like music derived, to some extent more commonly, from 
existing works.  Accordingly, the shortcomings of both copyright 
law and the fair use doctrine have become increasingly more 
apparent over time.
184
 
Congress codified the fair use defense in the 1976 version of 
the Copyright Act.  The statutory language includes a non-
exclusive list of permitted uses.
185
  Courts apply a four-factor test 
 
 180 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (articulating early 
fair use principles that were in sum and substance codified in the 1976 Act); see also 
Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 546 (citing William F. Patry & Richard A. 
Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 
1644 (2004)). 
 181 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (citing Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)). 
 182 See Arewa, Bach to Hip Hop, supra note 15, at 555; see also supra note 145 and 
accompanying text. 
 183 See Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 547–48 (―[C]opying considered in 
this context typically related to reprinting existing works, at times in an abridged 
format.‖) (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 5 
(1985)).  Therefore, concludes Professor Arewa, early uses of the fair use defense 
actually were focused on ―fair abridgement,‖ a condensed version of the same work. 
Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 548. 
 184 See Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 549. (―This broader application of 
fair use doctrine in copyright cases is problematic and reflects the general difficulties 
apparent in copyright treatment of works derived from existing works.‖). 
 185 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  The non-exclusive enumerated purposes are: ―criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research.‖ Id. 
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to determine whether or not an unauthorized use is deemed fair.
186
  
Despite being codified, the fair use defense seems to have 
preserved its foundational nature ―as an equitable rule of reason to 
be applied where a finding of infringement would either be unfair 
or undermine ‗the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.‘‖187  
However, despite being—at least theoretically—―equitable and 
flexible‖ the fair use doctrine is also considered by practitioners, 
academics and judges alike as ―the most troublesome in the whole 
law of copyright . . . .‖188 
Some scholars have noted that fair use reflects the same 
troubling assumptions about incentives to create, the concept of 
originality and the historical relevance of borrowing in some cases 
as does the overall justification for the monopoly itself.
189
  Fair use 
doctrine, like copyright, is premised on the copyright being 
recognized and protected as a property rule.
190
  Fair use is also 
based on the assumption that ―borrowing is not the norm‖ in the 
creative process and, therefore, unauthorized uses should be 
regulated and limited accordingly.
191
  As such, fair use is also 
limited in its applicability to cases involving music,
192
 especially a 
 
 186 The four factors are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. 
Id. 
 187 LEAFFER, supra note 176, at 487 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 188 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 189 See Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 550 (―The assumptions underlying 
fair use do not always translate well outside of the context of literary works and 
parodies.‖). 
 190 See Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 551; see also supra Part I.B.3. 
 191 Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 551. 
 192 Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 546 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994)) (noting the limitations of fair use doctrine).  
Professor Arewa notes that ―[a]lthough fair use offers one basis upon which existing 
works may be used, it is limited in two significant respects.‖  First is its limited 
applicability to types of cultural production other than commentary and parody (namely 
musical notes).  Second is that fair use does not operate in an expansive or balanced way 
in the present copyright environment.  This reality ―may effectively hinder use of existing 
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genre like hip hop in which the methodology of creation relies so 
heavily on sampling. 
Of the four fair use factors, the first factor (the purpose and 
character of the use) is the most relevant in a discussion of the 
legality of sampling.
193
  The first factor assesses the productive or 
transformative nature of the new work.
194
  A work is found to be 
transformative if it embodies contributions by the second author 
that are socially beneficial for a purpose or in a manner different 
from the copied work.
195
  In theory, the transformative fair use 
standard is meant to permit the doctrine as a whole to be applied 
more broadly.  Broader application, in turn, would allow for more 
unauthorized uses to be deemed fair.
196
  A wider spectrum of 
permissible uses broadens access to copyrighted works by second-
generation authors and the public and, accordingly, promotes 
―progress.‖  But based on the enumerated criteria for the nature 
and purpose of use factor, it is unlikely that most samples will be 
deemed lawful appropriation under the circumstances.
197
  Until fair 
use reflects the cultural context and norms of how art forms like 
music are produced, it will fail to encourage the production of 
innovative works like the musical collage.
198
 
 
works without prior consent, even seemingly clear instances of fair use.‖ Id. at 547; see 
also id. at 550 (noting the ill fit of copyright to music) (citations omitted). 
 193 Nonetheless, a court must also analyze the remaining three factors of the fair use 
doctrine.  Additionally, courts‘ analysis of the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the 
potential market, has been often characterized as the ―single most important element of 
fair use.‖ Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).  
Courts focus generally on the potential harm to the market, not proof of actual harm. See 
LEAFFER, supra note 176, at 501. 
 194 LEAFFER, supra note 176, at 495.  ―Productive use‖ occurs when another uses the 
copyrighted works by adding her own creative edge. Id. at 490.  ―Transformative use‖ 
occurs when value is added to the copyrighted work by ―new information, new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings.‖ Id. 
 195 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 
(1990). 
 196 See Arewa, Freedom to Copy, supra note 15, at 550 (citing Leval, supra note 195, at 
1111).   
 197 See Szymanski, supra note 78, at 312. 
 198 See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of Public Enemy‘s use of aural fragments to 
create ―musical collages‖ with the sampler. 
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E. A Tale of Two Music Copyrights 
Copyright law as originally conceived did not contemplate or 
protect music.  The 1909 version of the Copyright Act protected 
textual works (books, charts and maps) but it also included limited 
protection of musical compositions via the ―canned music‖ 
clause.
199
  Both the music and lyrics were protected by the 1831 
extension of the 1790 version of the Act.
200
  Until the mid-
nineteenth century, composers were protected only against literal 
copying.
201
  As copyright law expanded to include other literary 
and artistic works,
202
 later versions failed to address adequately the 
differences in how literary and artistic works are created given that 
performance-arts like music have traditionally utilized 
collaboration (with and without attribution) and borrowing (with 
and without permission) in the creative process.
203
  Such 
unattributed collaboration and unauthorized borrowing is contrary 
to the ―independent creation‖ requirement in copyright law204 and 
European notions of the Romantic Author who is seen as creator in 
isolation by way of inspiration alone.
205
 
 
 199 See generally Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 3 (―[T]he ‗work‘ shielded 
by the statute was the literal text, nothing more.‖).  Professor Fisher provides a 
substantive history of the development of copyright law in America as copyright holder 
entitlement continued to expand and the duration of protection continued to lengthen. Id. 
at 2.  Further, he details the confluence of factors that lead to such expansion, not the 
least of which was a fundamental change to the foundation of the American economy 
from agriculture to manufacturing to industry to information technology. Id. at 10. 
 200 Arewa, Bach to Hip Hop, supra note 15, at 558 (citing LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, 
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 201 (1968)). 
 201 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 202 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 203 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 204 See supra Part II.B. 
 205 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 15–17 (noting the collaborative nature 
of most forms of literary and artistic expression).  Professor Fisher argues that, despite 
the reality that ―the extent to which every creator depends upon and incorporates into her 
work the creation of her predecessors is becoming ever more obvious[,] . . . American 
lawmakers cling stubbornly to the romantic vision.‖ Id. at 16–17;  see also Arewa, 
Catfish Row, supra note 21, at 333 (―The ‗Romantic author‘ concept, which emphasizes 
the unique and genius-like contributions of individual creators and inventors, is a primary 
mechanism by which borrowing and collaboration are denied.‖); Arewa, Freedom to 
Copy, supra note 15, at 512 (noting that exclusive intellectual property rights are often 
justified by a focus on ―romantic‖ notions of originality, labor, personality or sheer 
genius of the author in creating the work); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: 
EVANS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2011  3:20 PM 
2011] SAMPLING, LOOPING, AND MASHING 881 
In 1971, the Copyright Act was amended to provide copyright 
protection for sound recordings to prevent piracy of albums.
206
  
Prior to this amendment, the topic of creating a limited copyright 
in sound recordings had been considered for several years in 
connection with the overall revision of the Copyright Act.
207
  At 
that time, only the copyright in underlying musical works was 
protected from unauthorized and uncompensated duplication but 
there was no federal protection of the recordings of those 
compositions.
208
  As a result, sound recordings could be and were 
duplicated without violating the Copyright Act. 
Trade sources estimated the annual volume of wholesale piracy 
of records at the time to exceed $100 million.
209
  Although a 
statutorily prescribed mechanical royalty scheme already existed to 
compensate music composers whose music and lyrics were 
reproduced in copies of albums and tapes, no similar scheme 
existed to compensate the owners of the master recordings 
themselves.
210
  A minority of states enacted statutes to combat 
unauthorized duplication of sound recordings.
211
  The majority, 
however, had only unfair competition laws and limited 
remedies.
212
  Further, the jurisdiction of states to regulate in this 
 
Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293 
(1992); Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279 (1992). 
 206 See THE HOUSE REPORT ON THE SOUND RECORDING AMENDMENT OF 1971, H.R. REP. 
NO. 92–487, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566. 
 207 See id. at 3. 
 208 See id. at 2. 
 209 See id. It has also been estimated that legitimate sales had an annual value of 
approximately $300 million, thus demonstrating that piracy had a substantial impact on 
potential sales: ―The pirating of records and tapes is not only depriving legitimate 
manufacturers of substantial income, but of equal importance is denying performing 
artists and musicians of royalties and contributions to pension and welfare funds and 
Federal and State governments are losing tax revenues.‖ Id.  
 210 See id. 
 211 See id. (―Eight States have enacted statutes intended to suppress record piracy . . . 
.‖). 
 212 See id.  
[I]n other jurisdictions the only remedy available to the legitimate 
producers is to seek relief in State courts on the theory of unfair 
competition.  A number of suits have been filed in various States but 
even when a case is brought to a successful conclusion the remedies 
available are limited. 
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area was in question due to federal preemption of copyright 
issues.
213
 
An alarmed record industry lobbied Congress aggressively to 
protect sound recordings and convinced the legislators to proceed 
in a piecemeal and expedited fashion to address ―recordings 
piracy‖ before fleshing out completely the larger revision of the 
Act.
214
  Efforts to complete the entire general amendment were 
stalled due to unresolved issues about cable television.  Even the 
Register of Copyrights recommended that the sound recording 
issue be resolved quickly.
215
  Instead of lawmakers drafting the 
language, they left the precise wording to the industry interest-
holders themselves.
216
  The resulting legislation was skewed 
heavily in favor of those interest-holders (music industry 
executives) and ultimately not reflective of any public benefit that 
justified creating such a copyright monopoly in the first 
instance.
217
 
The Departments of State, Justice and Commerce and the 
Copyright Office all favored enactment of a limited right in sound 
recordings.
218
  Congress also considered a proposal to create a 
 
Id. 
 213 See id. at 2–3. (―[T]he jurisdiction of States to adopt legislation specifically aimed at 
the elimination of record and tape piracy has been challenged on the theory that the 
copyright clause of the Federal Constitution has preempted the field even if Congress has 
not granted any copyright protection to sound recordings.‖). 
 214 See id.  
 215 See id. at 10.  The House Report quoted comments that L. Quincy Mumford, 
Librarian of Congress, wrote to the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee: 
[S]ome fundamental problems impeding the progress of general 
revision of the copyright law, notably the issue of cable television, 
have not yet been resolved.  We agree that the national and 
international problem of record piracy is too urgent to await 
comprehensive action on copyright law revision, and that the 
amendments proposed in S. 646 are badly needed now. 
Id. 
 216 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that instead of drafting the 
language themselves, the Congressional committees and subcommittees charged with 
overseeing that reform forced the interested parties to negotiate for the content of the 
statute).  
 217 See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
 218 See THE HOUSE REPORT ON THE SOUND RECORDING AMENDMENT OF 1971, H.R. REP. 
NO. 92–487, at 7 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566.  Interestingly, at least 
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compulsory licensing scheme for sound recordings.
219
  The 
proposal included statutorily prescribed amounts that users would 
be required to pay sound recording copyright holders to 
compensate them for reproductions of their recordings.
220
  Initially 
it was deemed an appropriate and reasonable complement to the 
compulsory licensing of musical compositions.
221
  This proposal 
was vigorously proffered in Senate Committee hearings and 
strongly reiterated in hearings before the House Subcommittee.
222
  
But ultimately it was rejected when the Senate Committee 
concluded the two situations (protection of musical compositions 
and protection of sound recordings) were not parallel.
223
  
Specifically, the Committee determined that while a compulsory 
license in the case of musical compositions gave necessary access 
to raw material, there was no analogous benefit to grant the same 
access to the ―finished product.‖224 
In the final analysis, the House Committee believed the need to 
protect albums from being pirated was strong but the case for 
compulsory licensing was weak.
225
  In its explanation of sound 
recordings as the type of ―copyrightable subject matter‖ to 
constitute a ―work,‖ the House Report explained the amendment 
was intended to apply to wholesale copying of entire sound 
recordings: ―Aside from cases in which sounds are fixed by some 
purely mechanical means without originality of any kind, the 
 
one bill included a provision to add a public performance right so that record companies 
and performing artists would be compensated when their records were performed for 
commercial purposes. Id. at 3.  Ultimately, however, no such right was included. Id. 
 219 See id. at 4 (citing S. REP. NO. 92–72, accompanying S. 646). 
 220 See id. 
 221 See id. 
 222 See id. 
 223 See id. 
 224 See id. (―In the view of the Senate Committee, there is no justification for the 
granting of a compulsory license to copy the finished product, which has been developed 
and promoted through the efforts of the record company and the artists.‖ (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Thus, the legislative history shows that both the industry and 
Congress were focused on preventing album piracy and not copying parts of the album.  
Of course, I acknowledge that the practice of sampling had not yet entered the equation. 
However, now that sampling involves using portions of sound recordings as creative 
―raw material,‖ the ―analogous benefit‖ to grant the same access to sound recordings 
should be reconsidered. 
 225 See id.  
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committee favors copyright protection that would prevent the 
reproduction and distribution of unauthorized reproductions of 
sound recordings.‖226  It seems, therefore, it would have been 
illogical at the time to include compulsory licensing of entire 
sound recordings, the very issue Congress sought to remedy and 
avoid.  It follows, then, that direct sampling of only a portion was 
not contemplated and no per se rule or departure from traditional 
infringement analysis was intended. 
This distinction is critical in digital sampling infringement 
cases because, as discussed in Part II.C herein, the scope of an 
infringement inquiry is much narrower for sound recordings than 
for the underlying work.
227
  Whereas ―substantial similarity‖ is the 
primary inquiry in cases involving infringement of the musical 
composition, the only issue in the case of sound recordings based 
on a Bridgeport per se infringement analysis is whether any part or 
all of the actual sound recording has been used without 
permission.
228
 
As a result, the Bridgeport approach rejects the substantial 
similarity inquiry in infringement cases involving sound recordings 
and examines only whether the defendant copied.  If so, this 
approach finds infringement per se, without any consideration of 
whether a use might be deemed de minimis or fair.  Anyone who 
samples a copyrighted work is required to secure a negotiated 
license in every case to avoid infringement regardless of how much 
(or little) is used.
229
  However, the copyright monopoly—a 
 
 226 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).  
 227 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 798 n.6 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
 228 See id. 
In most copyright actions, the issue is whether the infringing work is 
substantially similar to the original work. . . . The scope of inquiry is 
much narrower when the work in question is a sound recording.  The 
only issue is whether the actual sound recording has been used 
without authorization.  Substantial similarity is not an issue. . . . 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 229 See Szymanski, supra note 78, at 290 (―[R]ecord companies, music publishers, and 
artists have developed an ad hoc negotiated licensing scheme to address the issue of 
compensation for sampled artists.‖).  There are three types of negotiated licenses in the 
industry: (1) flat fee; (2) negotiated mechanical license fee entitling the sampled owner to 
receive a payment for each record sold; and (most commonly) (3) a co-publishing 
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privilege—was never intended to be absolute.  The limited sound 
recording copyright should not be more comprehensive than the 
broad rights in the underlying work. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF A FRACTURED MUSIC COPYRIGHT 
FRAMEWORK 
A.  Incongruent Treatment of Sound Recording Infringement 
Among the Circuits 
1. Bridgeport: A Bright-Line Illuminates a Dark Reality 
An example of the stifling effect of copyright law on music is 
the impact on the practice of sampling of the per se infringement 
rule articulated in Bridgeport v. Dimension Films for unauthorized 
copying of any amount of a sound recording without the copyright 
holder‘s permission.230 
In 2001, plaintiffs Bridgeport Music, Inc., Southfield Music, 
Inc., Westbound Records, Inc., and Nine Records, Inc. (all related 
entities), became greatly concerned with what they considered to 
be rampant infringement of their sound recordings.
231
  
Accordingly, they went on the offensive to challenge the practice 
by filing nearly 500 copyright infringement counts against 
approximately 800 defendants.
232
  Ultimately, the district court 
severed the original complaint into 476 individual actions, one of 
which was the case against No Limit Films.
233
 
The relevant controversy arose out of the use of a digital 
sample of both the Funkadelic musical composition and sound 
 
agreement in which the sampled owner receives a legal and financial interest in the new 
work. Id. at 292. 
 230 See generally Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 231 See id. at 795.  Bridgeport and Southfield are music publishers and Westbound 
Records and Nine Records are recording companies. See id. 
 232 See id.  All of the claims against Miramax Film Corp. and Dimension Films were 
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a settlement agreement on June 27, 2002. See id. at 
795 n.1. 
 233 See id. at 795.  Because neither Southfield nor Nine established they had any 
ownership interest in the copyrights at issue, the district court found them jointly and 
severally liable for 10% of attorneys‘ fees and costs. Id. at 795–96. 
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recording of ―Get Off Your Ass and Jam‖ (―Get Off‖) in N.W.A.‘s 
rap song ―100 Miles and Runnin‘‖ (―100 Miles‖).234  ―100 Miles‖ 
was included in the movie soundtrack for the motion picture ―I Got 
the Hook Up‖ (―Hook Up‖) released by No Limit Films in May of 
1998.
235
  The sample at issue was an arpeggiated chord, defined as 
―three notes that, if struck together, comprise a chord but instead 
are played one at a time in very quick succession.‖236  This chord, 
played on an unaccompanied electric guitar, is repeated several 
times at the opening of ―Get Off.‖237  The district court described 
the resulting sound as ―a high-pitched, whirling sound that captures 
the listener‘s attention and creates anticipation of what is to 
follow.‖238  The ―Get Off‖ sample consists of a two-second portion 
of the arpeggiated chord section that was looped fourteen to 
sixteen times in ―100 Miles‖ and appears at five separate points in 
the song.
239
  The district court found that the looped segment lasted 
approximately seven seconds and therefore made up forty seconds 
of the four-minute-thirty-second song.
240
 
After sorting through the numerous assertions by Bridgeport in 
support of its copyright infringement claim of the underlying 
work,
241
 the court focused on the infringement claim that involved 
 
 234 See id. at 795. 
 235 See id. 
 236 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 839 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2002). 
 237 See id.  To listen to and compare ―Get Off‖ and ―100 Miles‖ visit 
http://www.whosampled.com.   
 238 Id. 
 239 See id. at 841. 
 240 See id. 
 241 Although ―100 Miles‖ was originally owned by four entities, in December 1998, 
Bridgeport acquired a 25% interest in the ―100 Miles‖ musical composition as 
compensation for licensing the right to sample ―Get Off‖ to be used in ―100 Miles‖ that 
was owned by Bridgeport. Id. at 834.  Apparently, No Limit had acquired from the other 
co-owners of ―100 Miles‖ various oral and written licenses to use the musical 
composition in the film and asserted this fact as the basis of its defense. Id. at 833.  
Additionally, in the sample licensing agreement between the original ―100 Miles‖ owners 
and Bridgeport that granted to Bridgeport the 25% interest in ―100 Miles,‖ Bridgeport 
licensed to the other parties and their licensees and assigns the irrevocable right to use 
the ―Get Off‖ sample in ―100 Miles.‖ Id. at 834.  Bridgeport challenged the retroactive 
effectiveness of this benefit to licensees of the parties to the agreement; namely, 
defendant Dimension Films. Id. at 833. 
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the unauthorized use of the ―Get Off‖ sample in ―100 Miles.‖  No 
Limit moved for summary judgment defending its use on two 
grounds.  First, No Limit attacked the chord‘s originality by 
arguing that the portion of ―Get Off‖ used ―was not original and 
therefore not protected by copyright law.‖242  Alternatively, No 
Limit asserted a de minimis use defense arguing the sample was 
―legally insubstantial and therefore . . . [not] actionable copying 
under copyright law.‖243  Accordingly, the court assumed—and No 
Limit did not contest—that the sample was in fact digitally copied 
directly from the sound recording rather than re-created in the 
studio.
244
 
In support of No Limit‘s first ―lack of originality‖ defense, it 
claimed the arpeggiated chord was a commonly used three-note 
chord.
245
  Westbound countered that the chord was completely 
unique.
246
  Taking into account the limited number of musical 
notes and chords available, the district court focused not on the 
originality of the chord but on the way it was used and its ―aural 
effect‖ in the sampled work, especially ―where copying of the 
sound recording is at issue.‖247  The district court concluded that a 
jury could reasonably conclude that the way the chord is used in 
―Get Off‖ was both ―original and creative and therefore entitled to 
copyright protection.‖248  Accordingly, on this issue, No Limit‘s 
motion for summary judgment was denied.
249
 
As for No Limit‘s de minimis use argument, the district court 
navigated its way through a detailed analysis of the law and 
principles traditionally applied in de minimis defense cases to 
―balance the interests protected by the copyright laws against the 
stifling effect that overly rigid enforcement of these laws may have 
on the artistic development of new works.‖250  The court focused 
 
 242 Id. at 838. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
245  Id. 
 246 Id. at 839. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. at 840 (citing Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d 
Cir. 1983)). 
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on the question of ―substantial similarity‖ and the various ways 
courts can assess this element, namely the 
―qualitative/quantitative‖251 and the ―fragmented literal 
similarity‖252 analyses.  It concluded that under either approach, 
the sample did not amount to a ―legally cognizable 
appropriation.‖253  Accordingly, the district court granted No 
Limit‘s motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed.254 
On appeal, the circuit court dismissed the district court‘s effort 
to apply traditional infringement analyses to the case at hand.
255
  
Instead, it fashioned a per se infringement rule triggered whenever 
someone copies any part of a sound recording without any 
consideration for substantial similarity or de minimis use.
256
  The 
court noted it preferred the ―clarity‖ that bright-line rules provide 
despite the absence of such an approach in traditional infringement 
analysis.
257
  The court attempted to justify its ruling by concluding 
that if one cannot pirate ―the whole,‖ one cannot copy less than the 
whole without permission either.
258
  Further, the court read the 
derivative work right set forth in § 114(b) of the Act to mean a 
sound recording copyright holder has the exclusive right to 
sample.
259
 
 
 251 See id. at 841 (citing Newton v. Diamond, 204  F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 
2002)). 
 252 See id. at 841 (citing Williams v. Broadus, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1051, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001)); 4-13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.03[A][2] (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2011). 
 253 See Bridgeport, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 841. 
 254 The procedural history of this case is somewhat convoluted.  The Sixth Circuit 
issued an initial opinion in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th 
Cir. 2004).  Through an Order entered December 20, 2004, the full court denied No Limit 
Films‘ petition for rehearing en banc but granted a panel rehearing to reassess the issue of 
digital sampling of a copyrighted sound recording. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).  All parties submitted additional briefs 
and arguments on rehearing. Id. 
 255 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 798. 
 256 Id. at 798. 
257 Id. at 799. 
 258 Id. at 800. 
 259 Id. at 801.  For a substantive analysis and critique of the Bridgeport case, see M. 
Leah Somoano, Note, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: Has Unlicensed 
Digital Sampling of Copyrighted Sound Recordings Come to an End?, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 289 (2006). 
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The Bridgeport decision has received some criticism from 
other circuits.
260
  Not all circuits apply a per se infringement 
standard in sound recording infringement cases.
261
  Thus, a split 
has emerged.  Of the countless laudable arguments asserted to 
justify amending the Act, a circuit split may prove to be the tipping 
point leading at a minimum to a judicial remedy, or more 
necessarily, a legislative one. 
Further, a change in the way copyright law is applied to sound 
recording sampling is not only needed but inevitable to allow for 
these types of uses in order to encourage the development of a rich 
reservoir of cultural benefits from the musical arts and to bring 
music copyright in line with the traditions of music creation.
262
  At 
a minimum, the Bridgeport per se infringement rule should be 
overturned and the traditional defenses of de minimis and fair use 
should be applied in all sound recording infringement cases.  Such 
a shift—either by judicial decision or legislative action—would 
necessarily contemplate and honor the actual complexities in the 
process of creating music since a musician‘s or music producer‘s 
 
 260 See generally Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 
2009). 
 261 See generally Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998); 
see also Part III.B. 
 262 Scholars and students have been asserting this position since the early nineties. See, 
e.g., Kenneth Achenbach, Grey Area: How Recent Developments in Digital Music 
Production Have Necessitated the Reexamination of Compulsory Licensing for Sample-
Based Works, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 187 (2004) (citing Jason S. Rooks, Note, 
Constitutionality of Judicially-Imposed Compulsory Licenses in Copyright Infringement 
Cases, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255 (1995)); Michael L. Boroni, A Pirate’s Palette: The 
Dilemmas of Digital Sound Sampling and a Proposed Compulsory License Solution, 11 
U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 65 (1993); Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: 
Measuring the Legitimacy of Unauthorized Compositional Sampling—A Clue Illuminated 
and Obscured, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 123 (2003); Ponte, supra note 149, 
at 515; Szymanski, supra note 78, at 271; David S. Blessing, Note, Who Speaks Latin 
Anymore? Translating De Minimis Use for Application to Music Copyright Infringement 
and Sampling, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2399, 2404 (2004); Neela Kartha, Comment, 
Digital Sampling and Copyright Law in a Social Context: No More Color-Blindness!!, 14 
U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 218, 224 (1997); Randy S. Kravis, Comment, Does a 
Song by any Other Name Sound as Sweet?: Digital Sampling and Its Copyright 
Implications, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 231 (1993)).  However, the issue has now reached a 
boiling point as even judges have commented on the unsoundness of a per se 
infringement rule for sound recordings. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing Judge Seitz‘s 
critique of the Bridgeport decision in Saregama). 
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new work is often (if not always) informed by and built upon the 
foundation of existing works.  Consistent application of copyright 
law would also provide ―clarity‖ for the music industry without the 
need for a purportedly clarifying bright-line rule.  It would also 
permit federal courts to engage in the type of balancing of rights 
and remedies to honor the Constitutional justification for 
intellectual property monopolies.
263
 
2. Saregama: Light at the End of the Per Se Tunnel?264 
The dispute in Saregama arose out of producer Tim Mosley‘s 
use of an Indian sound recording titled ―Bagor Mein Bahar Hai‖ 
(―BMBH‖) in the song ―Put You on the Game‖ (―PYOG‖) which 
appeared on Jayceon Taylor‘s 2005 album, ―The Documentary.‖265  
Saregama asserted that it held a copyright interest in BMBH 
pursuant to an assignment of rights from its predecessors in 
interest, Shakti Films and Gramophone Co. of India.
266
  After 
establishing its ownership interest in BMBH and accordingly, its 
standing to sue for infringement, Saregama moved for summary 
judgment because Mosley admitted he had used a sample of the 
BMBH sound recording in PYOG.
267
 
The defendants asserted several arguments, two of which are 
relevant to this Article and consistent with the defenses proffered 
 
 263 Arewa, Catfish Row, supra note 21, at 338 (―Copyrights should be granted and 
enforced in a way that is informed by the context of their operation and consideration of 
the underlying rationales of copyright and actual uses of copyright.‖). 
 264 Saregama, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.  This case involves a somewhat convoluted 
procedural history.  Saregama filed its initial complaint in the Southern District of New 
York but the case was removed to the Southern District of Florida on defendants‘ motion 
to transfer venue.  The court granted defendants‘ motion to dismiss with leave for 
Saregama to re-plead, which it did. Mosley, G-Unit and Desperado and remaining 
defendants, Warner Bros. and Universal, again filed a motion to dismiss which was 
granted in part and denied in part, leaving only the federal copyright claims involving the 
musical composition and sound recording.  Thereafter, Saregama voluntarily dismissed 
the musical composition claims and the court thereafter focused on the alleged 
infringement of the sound recording. Id. at 1342. 
 265 Id. at 1331. The other named defendants were G-Unit Records and Desperado, both 
of which apparently had no involvement in creating, distributing or selling ―Put You on 
the Game‖ and were only involved as passive recipients of publishing income pursuant to 
contract. Id. 
 266 Id. at 1327. 
 267 Id. 
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but rejected by the Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport.  The first argument 
challenged BMBH‘s originality and the second was based on lack 
of substantial similarity.  The court noted the sample was a one-
second snippet of a G minor chord looped four times in the 
chorus.
268
  The parties cross-moved for summary judgment.
269
  The 
question presented was whether such copying is legally actionable; 
that is, whether there is sufficient originality to be protectable and 
substantial similarity between the resulting work and the any 
protectable elements.
270
 
As discussed in Part II.C, herein, two works are substantially 
similar if ―an average lay observer would recognize the alleged 
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.‖271  
The similarity can be either literal (as in the case of direct copying) 
or non-literal.  Even where there is but a small amount of literal 
similarity (known as ―fragmented literal similarity‖), substantial 
similarity can still be found if the fragmented copy is important to 
the copied work and of sufficient quantity.
272
 
The court analyzed whether a resulting work was substantially 
similar to the copyrightable aspects of the sampled work.  It 
focused on the songs, ―taken as a whole‖ in its determination of 
whether there was any similarity and, if so, whether the similarity 
was substantial or merely de minimis.
273
  The court found that 
other than the one-second snippet, the songs did not bear any 
similarities and therefore no copyright infringement existed.
274
  
Taken as a whole, the songs were deemed completely different, 
with different lyrical content, tempo, rhythms, and 
arrangements.
275
  The court noted further that it was highly 
unlikely the average listener could recognize the sampled song in 
 
 268 Id. at 1331. 
269  Id. 
 270 Id. at 1336. 
 271 Id. at 1337. 
 272 Id. at 1337–38 (favoring the ―single-inquiry‖ approach developed in Oravec v. 
Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008) over the ―extrinsic‖ 
and ―intrinsic‖ tests developed in prior Eleventh Circuit cases).  
 273 Id. at 1338. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
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the resulting work.
276
  As sampling technology allows the sampled 
portion of an existing work to be manipulated to the point of being 
virtually (if not completely) unrecognizable, the Saregama court‘s 
holding is likely to result in a spike in infringement cases involving 
samples.
277
  
With the court‘s decision rendered, Judge Patricia Seitz then 
turned her attention to the Bridgeport case to address the plaintiff‘s 
alternative argument: that sound recordings like BMBH should be 
treated differently than other copyrighted works in light of that 
case.
278
  Judge Seitz made clear that the Eleventh Circuit ―imposes 
a ‗substantial similarity‘ requirement as a constituent element of 
all infringement claims . . . .‖279  Judge Seitz questioned the Sixth 
Circuit‘s decision to carve out an exception to the substantial 
similarity test for sound recordings.
280
  She expressed confusion as 
to the basis on which the Bridgeport court chose to read § 114(b) 
so narrowly, especially in light of the fact that § 114(b) applies to 
the scope and protection of derivative works, not original works.
281
 
Judge Seitz found no indication in the legislative history or 
legislative intent consistent with the Bridgeport court‘s reading of 
§ 114(b) that essentially expands—rather than limits—the scope of 
protection for original works.
282
  Specifically, Judge Seitz noted 
that Bridgeport redefined ―derivative work‖ incorrectly as any 
work containing any sound from the original.
283
  If the Bridgeport 
court‘s reading of that section is correct, then we must accept that 
Congress sought to expand the scope of copyright protection for 
original works ―by redefining the term ‗derivative work‘ to include 
all works containing any sound from the original sound recording‖ 
 
 276 Id. 
 277 See Szymanski, supra note 78, at 306 (―In many cases, sampling involves extensive 
manipulation of the data sequence of an original work to create an entirely new work.‖). 
 278 Saregama, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1338–39. 
 279 Id. at 1339 (citing Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 
2000)).   Judge Seitz noted that although the facts of that case and Bridgeport were 
similar, that court‘s decision to disregard a substantial similarity analysis represents a 
departure from Eleventh Circuit precedent. Id. 
 280 Id. at 1340. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. at 1341. 
 283 Id. at 1339. 
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regardless of whether the works are substantially similar.
284
  Like 
Judge Seitz, I find this reading implausible.
285
 
Thus, as noted above, a split has emerged in the federal circuits 
regarding copyright protection afforded sound recordings.  For this 
and other reasons set forth in this Article, I argue that Congress 
must revisit this issue to clarify and reconcile the varied 
approaches to this critical topic.  Congress must ensure that it 
fashions a rule that protects copyright holders, preserves traditional 
defenses to copyright infringement and encourages innovative 
means to create new works from existing creative material.
286
 
 
 284 Id. at 1340 (explaining that the court‘s reading of § 114(b) in Bridgeport prevents it 
from concluding that PYOG is a ―derivative work‖ of, and thereby infringes on, BMBH 
merely because it contains a one-second snippet of BMBH). 
 285 Id. at 1341 (―[S]tatutory protection for sound recordings extends only to the 
particular sounds of which the recording consists, and would not prevent a separate 
recording of another performance in which those sounds are imitated.‖).  Professor 
Nimmer concurs: 
By validating entire sound-alike recordings, the [independent creation 
provision] contains no implication that partial sound duplications are 
to be treated any differently from what is required by the traditional 
standards of copyright law which, for decades prior to adoption of the 
1976 Act and unceasingly in the decades since, has included the 
requirement of substantial similarity.  
Id. (quoting 4-13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.03[A][2][b]). 
 286 Despite the admonitions by undoubtedly esteemed copyright scholars like Doris 
Estelle Long, I intentionally blur the distinction between creativity (traditionally 
protected by copyright) and innovation (traditionally protected by patent).  At a recent 
symposium, Professor Long argued that ever since Congress extended copyright 
protection to software, the constitutional line between creative and inventive acts and 
resulting works has become blurred in troubling ways. See generally Symposium, When 
Worlds Collide: The Uneasy Convergence of Creativity and Innovation, 25 J. MARSHALL 
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 653 (2009).  However, it is precisely because the line between art 
and innovation has and continues to be eroded by technological advances that I argue it is 
appropriate to challenge the traditional legal fences erected to provide bright-lines in the 
laws and policies that govern and shape the rights/access paradigm in intellectual 
property jurisprudence. See Tonya M. Evans, Sampling Patent to Remix Copyright (July 
10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Evans, Sampling 
Patent to Remix Copyright]. 
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B.  Consequences of Incongruent Treatment of Musical 
Compositions and Sound Recordings 
In this post-Bridgeport era, it seems the traditional defenses to 
a copyright infringement action of de minimis use and uses deemed 
fair due to the ―transformative‖ nature of the use are not available 
(at least in some circuits) when the infringement claim is based on 
alleged copying of the sound recording.  However, these defenses 
remain viable for alleged infringement of the underlying musical 
composition.
287
 Additionally, although a compulsory licensing 
scheme exists for unauthorized use of musical compositions,
288
 no 
such regime exists for use of sound recordings.
289
 
This incongruent treatment of musical compositions and sound 
recordings has several negative consequences: higher transaction 
costs to secure licenses to sample sound recordings,
290
 inconsistent 
application of federal law among the circuits and dramatically 
reduced creative output.
291
  This result, in turn, has led to a 
particularly onerous impact on the hip hop genre, which relies 
heavily on the artistic value of sampling and other innovative uses 
of technology to create entirely new works.
292
 
IV. REMIXING COPYRIGHT TO ALLOW FOR CERTAIN INNOVATIVE 
USES OF TECHNOLOGY IN MUSIC CREATION 
A. The Tenuous Relationship Between the Intellectual Property 
Monopoly and Innovation 
―Progress of Science and useful Arts‖293 collectively may be 
categorized as a type of innovation traditionally referred to as a 
―public good.‖294  A government can respond in myriad ways to 
 
 287 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 288 See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). 
 289 See supra Part I.B.3. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 See supra note 98 for an example of the significantly higher transaction costs of 
negotiated licenses for sampling. 
 293 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 294 Fisher, IP & Innovation, supra note 129 (―This paper examines from various angles 
the complex relationship between intellectual-property rights and technological 
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strike the balance between recognizing an innovator‘s right to 
exploit her creation with the benefit to society of reasonable access 
to innovation.
295
  Copyright law is one such governmental response 
utilized to enhance and support a civil democratic society.
296
  
However, intellectual property rights regimes have several 
drawbacks: they are costly to administer, they sometimes impede 
innovation and they can be used offensively to price competitors 
out of the market with profit-maximizing pricing.
297
 
An imbalance occurs in the rights/access dichotomy when a 
grant of exclusive rights impedes unnecessarily ―cumulative 
 
innovation.‖).  Fisher, in an essay prepared for the Programme Seminar on Intellectual 
Property and Innovation in the Knowledge-based Economy, The Hague, suggests five 
strategies a government can employ to encourage innovation: (1) engage in technological 
innovation themselves; (2) subsidize innovative activities by private sectors; (3) issue 
post-hoc prizes or rewards to persons and organizations that provide the public socially 
beneficial innovations; (4) help innovators conceal from the general public information 
essential to implement their innovations (e.g., trade secret law); and (5) confer 
intellectual property rights upon innovators.  The last strategy, the author argues, allows 
the innovator to recoup her investment and to profit from the innovation. Id. at 2–3. 
 295 See Fisher, IP & Innovation, supra note 129, at 7 (examining the optimal scope of 
intellectual property laws based on a cost-benefit analysis).  Fisher explains the view of 
many intellectual property law proponents that ―[o]nly in the rare situations in which 
transaction costs would prevent such voluntary exchanges should intellectual-property 
owners be denied absolute control over the uses of their works—either through an 
outright privilege (such as the fair-use doctrine) or through a compulsory licensing 
system.‖ Id.; see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) 
(―The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‗author‘s‘ 
creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity 
for the general public good.‖).  The notion that a person should own and/or control that 
which she created is commonly referred to as the labor-desert theory of property 
generally associated with John Locke. See Fisher, The Growth of IP, supra note 1, at 12 
(citing John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 303–20 (P. Laslett ed. 1970)).   
 296 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
291 (1996) (asserting a ―democratic paradigm‖ as a conceptual framework for copyright 
law that exists between neoclassisist overprotectionism and minimalism).  ―[T]his 
democratic paradigm views copyright law as a state measure designed to enhance the 
independent and pluralist character of a civil society.‖ Id.  Netanel argues that the 
―democratic paradigm‖ relies on copyright protection that is both sufficiently strong and 
limited ―to make room for—and, indeed, to encourage—many transformative and 
educative uses of existing works.‖ Id. at 288. 
 297 See Fisher, IP & Innovation, supra note 129, at 4. 
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innovations.‖298  A related concern is the increased transaction 
costs that effectively price some innovators out of the market.
299
  
Accordingly, copyright laws that limit or prohibit access, 
especially without the benefits of a substantial similarity, fair use 
or de minimis use analysis, ―should be protected only when their 
benefits (i.e., increased productivity) outweigh the aforementioned 
social costs.‖300  Stated more succinctly, ―the question of how 
extensive copyright protection should be . . . depends on the costs 
as well as the benefits of protection.‖301  Therefore, copyright law 
must be remixed to achieve an optimal balance between a 
copyright holder‘s exclusive rights and the legal space a second 
generation innovator needs to build upon existing works in order to 
create new ones in cumulative creative genres like music. 
Congress attempted to do just that when it enacted the sui 
generis legislation titled the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 
(―SCPA‖).302  By enacting the SCPA, Congress sought to provide 
second generation creators in the semiconductor chip industry the 
―legal space‖ to allow for borrowing, cumulative works, and 
 
 298 See Fisher, IP & Innovation, supra note 129, at 4.  The point, and one of the most 
pressing concerns in current music copyright law, is illustrated with the following 
example:  
Suppose Innovator #2 wishes to build upon the work of Innovator #1.  
The need to secure a license from Innovator #1 will, at a minimum, 
add to Innovator #2‘s costs.  If, for some reason, Innovator #1 is 
unable or unwilling to grant the license, the work of Innovator #2 
may be frustrated altogether.  
Id. 
 299 See Fisher, IP & Innovation, supra note 129, at 4.  (―By empowering innovators to 
charge consumers more than the marginal cost of replicating their innovations, 
intellectual-property rights have the unfortunate effect of pricing some consumers out of 
the markets for the goods produced with those innovations.‖). 
 300 Fisher, IP & Innovation, supra note 129, at 5; see also William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 333 
(1989), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/IPCoop/89land1.html (acknowledging 
that all new works are created in the context of and built upon existing works and noting 
the merits of broader fair use protections and weaker copyright protections to encourage 
borrowing to create new works). 
 301 WILLIAM M. LANDES, A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS 132, 133 (Ruth 
Towse ed., 2003). 
 302 Semiconductor Chip Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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innovation in the field.
303
  After assessing the needs and concerns 
of a unique industry, Congress fashioned a hybrid legal framework 
consisting of copyright and patent rights to balance optimally 
exclusive rights and innovation.
304
 
B. Sampling Patent to Remix Copyright305 
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.
306
 the United States 
Supreme Court described the process of ―reverse engineering‖ as 
―starting with the known product and working backward to divine 
the process which aided in its development or manufacture.‖307  
The general purpose of reverse engineering appears to be two-fold.  
First is to determine whether intellectual property rights have been 
infringed.
308
  Second is to develop competing or interoperable 
products.
309
  However, the fundamental purpose, posits treatise 
author James Pooley, is discovery, ―albeit of a path already 
taken.‖310 
In their noted Article, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, Professors Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne 
Scotchmer explain reverse engineering generally as ―the process of 
extracting know-how or knowledge from a human-made 
artifact.‖311  The authors further define ―human-made artifact‖ as 
an object that embodies knowledge or know-how previously 
discovered by others.
312
  Reverse engineering is treated generally 
 
 303 See generally Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 491, 
494 (S.D. Cal. 1988). 
 304 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select 
Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 447 (2009) (noting that the semiconductor 
industry was a sharing regime from its inception).  Professor Barnett provides an 
historical case study of the semiconductor industry that ―begins in a sharing regime that 
supports a collective innovation pool largely bereft of robust propertization, then 
experiences substantially increasing adoption and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, and then backtracks to a hybrid regime where cooperative arrangements are 
embedded within a property regime.‖ Id. 
 305 See Evans, Sampling Patent to Remix Copyright, supra note 286.  
 306 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 307 Id. at 476. 
 308 See J.T. Westermeier, Reverse Engineering, 984 PLI/PAT 289, 293 (2009).  
 309 See id. 
 310 JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRET LAW § 5.02 at 5–19 (1997). 
 311 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1577. 
 312 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1577 n.1. 
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by the courts as an important factor in maintaining balance in 
patent law by allowing innovators to enjoy the exclusive right to 
exclude others for a certain period of time as long as they disclose 
sufficient information about their invention to the public for 
someone skilled in the pertinent art to build upon existing art to 
produce further innovative goods.
313
 
Although the legal right to reverse engineer is well established 
in patent jurisprudence, no statutory reverse engineering right 
actually exists in the Patent Act.
314
  Yet reverse engineering is 
characterized as both an essential component of market 
competition and innovation
315
  and socially beneficial because ―it 
erodes a first comer‘s market power and promotes follow-on 
innovation.‖316 This Article posits that jurists and, ultimately, 
legislators faced with a fractured music copyright law framework 
can learn from the policies that protect and indeed encourage 
cumulative creation in the patent context.  A relevant example of 
how this might work is Congress‘s sui generis hybrid statutory 
approach to the semiconductor industry.
317
 
The SCPA sought to provide the optimum level of protection to 
creators while incorporating the industry customs of borrowing and 
cumulative creation and preserving the benefits of a richer, more 
vibrant, creative and innovative society.
318
  Ideally, the balance 
intellectual property laws seek to achieve is ―to design legal rules 
that protect information-rich products against market-destructive 
cloning while providing enough breathing room for reverse 
engineering to enable new entrants to compete and innovate in a 
competitively healthy way.‖319 
 
 313 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1583–84; see also Evans, Sampling 
Patent to Remix Copyright, supra note 286. 
 314 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1584. 
 315 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989). 
 316 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1660.  Of course, for that very reason, 
current stakeholders would strongly oppose a similar provision applied in the case of 
sound recordings. 
 317 See supra note 302. 
 318 See generally Evans, Sampling Patent to Remix Copyright, supra note 286.  
 319 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1580.  
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Therefore, intellectual property rules should be most narrowly 
tailored when innovation in the field tends to be highly 
cumulative.
320
  Such is the case in the creation of music, generally, 
and the art of sampling to create hip hop in particular; so too in the 
semiconductor chip industry.
321
  The need for narrowly tailored 
intellectual property laws is especially valid in light of the essential 
roles of access to first-generation works and a firmly established 
custom of borrowing in the creation process.
322
 
C. A Case Study: The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 
Until software was added to the mix of protected works, 
copyright was not even contemplated in a discussion of the reverse 
engineering privilege for two reasons.  First, artistic and literary 
works generally do not need to be ―reverse engineered‖ to be 
understood.
323
  Second, the ―know-how‖ generally associated with 
copyright exists on the face of the work.
324
  However, Congress 
enacted the SCPA to protect the semiconductor industry from 
piracy.
325
  The SCPA is the only statute to provide expressly for a 
reverse engineering defense that allows for more than 
interoperability.
326
  It permits copying to study the layout of 
 
 320 See Fisher, IP & Innovation, supra note 129; see also Evans, Sampling Patent to 
Remix Copyright, supra note 286. 
 321 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1597 (―[S]emiconductors are a 
cumulative system technology in which the interrelatedness of inventions requires 
extensive cross-licensing of patents in order for industry participants to make advanced 
chips.‖); see also Evans, Sampling Patent to Remix Copyright, supra note 286. 
 322 See Fisher, IP & Innovation, supra note 129. 
 323 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1585. 
 324 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1585 (―Books, paintings, and the like 
bear the know-how they contain on the face of the commercial product sold in the 
marketplace.‖).  The authors noted further that ―at least until the admission of computer 
programs to its domain, copyright law did not protect industrial products of the sort that 
firms typically reverse-engineer.‖ Id.  
 325 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–914.  In 1984, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act amended 
Title 17 of the United States Code to add a new Chapter 9 entitled ―Protection of 
Semiconductor Chip Products.‖ Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–914 (2006)).  For in-depth coverage of the SCPA and its reception 
by, and impact on, the relevant industry, see generally Steven P. Kasch, The 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Past, Present, and Future, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 71 
(1992). 
 326 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1).  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act also incorporates 
reverse engineering into its provisions.  However, in the DMCA, reverse engineering is 
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circuits and incorporate the learned know-how into a new chip.
327
  
The SCPA also requires ―forward engineering.‖328  In creating this 
sui generis intellectual property framework specifically for the 
semiconductor chip industry, Congress patterned it after copyright 
law but incorporated much of patent law.
329
  Notably, the SPCA 
basically codified an existing industry practice that permitted 
borrowing: collaboration in the form of, among other ways, reverse 
engineering.
330
 
Semiconductors are information technology products that, like 
literary and artistic works, bear much of their know-how and value 
on their face.
331
  They are also a ―cumulative system technology‖ 
that can be analogized to the custom of borrowing in the music 
creation process.
332
 The semiconductor chip industry, like the 
 
an exemption to the three anti-circumvention provisions in sections 1201(a)(1), 
1201(a)(2) and 1201(b). See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).  The purpose is to limit the DMCA 
provisions to allow for reverse engineering to achieve interoperability. See J.T. 
Westermeier, Reverse Engineering, supra note 308, at 306. 
 327 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1).  Copying in this context is more than ―mere copying‖ and 
contemplates ―substantial effort to study the competitive chip‖ and requires ―originality 
of the chip created through the process.‖ Edward K. Esping, Annotation, Reverse 
Engineering Under Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA) (17 U.S.C.A. §§ 
901 et seq.), 113 A.L.R. FED. 381, 381 (originally published in 1993). 
 328 See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (2006); Kasch, supra note 325, at 73.  Forward engineering 
is the opposite process of reverse engineering.  Where reverse engineering begins at the 
desired end result and works backwards, forward engineering takes what already exists 
and transforms it into some new result. See id. at 73 n.4. 
 329 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1600–01 (citing Copyright 
Protection for Semiconductor Chips: Hearing on H.R. 1028 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
98th Cong. 21–28 (1983) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of F. Thomas Dunlap, 
Jr., Corporate Counsel and Secretary, Intel Corp.) (explaining the industry‘s need for this 
legislation)). 
 330 ―Throughout its legislative history, the [SCPA] generated considerable interest 
among businessmen and lawyers.  Substantial litigation was anticipated following its 
enactment in November 1984; however, eight years [after its passage], only one 
published case, Brooktree v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., ha[d] been decided and the 
initial excitement has given way to largely academic interest.‖ Kasch, supra note 325, at 
72 (citing 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 331 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1595 (noting that this transparency 
makes semiconductor chips ―vulnerable to rapid, cheap, competitive cloning‖ and 
impedes the first innovator‘s ability to recoup her research and development costs 
necessary to produce the chip). 
 332 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1597. 
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music industry, had struggled to deter infringement without stifling 
innovation and was concerned with the impact of reverse 
engineering.  The legislative history of the SCPA may help to 
illustrate how Congress could approach music copyright reform.
333
  
The SCPA fashioned rules that both further innovation and protect 
the rights of existing innovators.
334
 
Originally, the industry‘s goal was to amend copyright law to 
add semiconductor chips to copyright‘s subject matter.  But 
because the chips proved so different from the existing covered 
works, an unlikely alliance formed to oppose adding the chips to 
the existing copyright structure.
335
  Eventually, Congress created 
the SCPA in 1984 to address the unique issues and concerns of the 
industry.
336
 
Witnesses testified during congressional hearings that it was 
established industry practice to copy competitor masks to analyze 
the copied chip in order to design another chip with the same 
characteristics.
337
  Further, witnesses asserted that custom should 
be captured in a sui generis rule patterned on the Copyright Act.
338
  
Essentially, the SCPA recognizes reverse engineering as a 
beneficial privilege that mirrors existing industry practice and 
distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate appropriation, the 
latter being the ―wholesale appropriation of the work and 
 
 333 See generally House Hearings, supra note 329. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1600.  Those who opposed adding 
semiconductor chips to copyright‘s subject matter included the Association of American 
Publishers and the Associate Register of Copyrights. Id. at 1599 n.113, 1600. 
 336 SCPA mirrors many of the Copyright Act‘s provisions: The subject matter is 
referred to as ―mask works,‖ the work must be original, rights attach automatically by 
operation of law, registration is not required (but is beneficial), and the substantial 
similarity analysis is involved and is based on a ―grant of exclusive rights to control 
reproductions and distributions of products embodying the protected work.‖ Samuelson 
& Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1601. 
 337 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1602 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-781, at 21 
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5770). 
 338 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1600 (citing House Hearings, supra note 
329, at 11–12 (statement of Jon A. Baumgarten, Copyright Counsel, Association of 
American Publishers). 
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investment in the creation of the first chip.‖339  The SCPA permits 
what Professors Samuelson and Scotchmer refer to as ―creative 
copying‖—building upon existing works to create something 
new—known in the industry as reverse engineering.340  
Accordingly, reverse engineering is viewed generally as a ―healthy 
way for second comers to get access to and discern the know-how 
embedded in an innovator‘s product.‖341 
Since Congress enacted the SCPA, only a handful of cases 
have been litigated.
342
  At first glance, the dearth of litigation could 
mean the SCPA successfully diminished piracy.  Alternatively, it 
could mean the legislation proved unimportant for a number of 
reasons.
343
  Regardless, the semiconductor industry continues to re-
calibrate and re-define domestic and international laws and policies 
and therefore the SCPA appears to have been positive (or at least 
not harmful) for the industry and innovation.  Despite increased 
―propertization‖ since 1988, an opposite and parallel track has 
apparently developed as well.  Formal propertization ―has been 
simultaneously limited‖ by efforts of that industry‘s leading firms 
to limit formal legal actions and to increase reciprocal access and 
strategic alliances.
344
  In other words, the existence of a formal 
legal framework has led the industry to seek a more equitable 
balance of rights and access, and ultimately, to encourage further 
innovation in the field.  The post-SCPA industry response, it 
seems, has led to lower transaction costs and further innovation 
 
 339 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1602 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-781, at 
21 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5771)). 
 340 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1603. 
 341 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1650. 
 342 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1605; Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 
424 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2005); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 
1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); 
Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega 
Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Brooktree Corp. v. 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Cal. 1988).  
 343  See, e.g., Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1605–06 (―One way to 
interpret the scarcity of litigation under the SCPA is as a sign that the law successfully 
deterred chip piracy.  However, most legal commentators have inferred from this that the 
SCPA is unimportant.‖); see also Kasch, supra note 325, at 72.  
 344 Barnett, supra note 304, at 453. 
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within the industry.
345
  This Article argues that Congress should 
pursue a similar legislative remedy and result for the music 
industry by sampling patent policies to remix music copyright. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems clear from over two hundred years of copyright 
jurisprudence and the constitutional directive enshrined in the 
Intellectual Property clause that the intention of the Founding 
Fathers was to use the means of ―exclusive rights‖ to achieve the 
ends of promoting ―the progress of science and useful arts.‖346  It 
was not, at least not primarily, to reward the labor of authors or to 
hamstring the ability of second-generation creators to build upon 
existing works in innovative ways never contemplated by early and 
even modern-day framers of copyright law and policy.
347
 
Even at its best, then, copyright law creates a tenuous 
relationship and delicate balance of rights that assures authors the 
right to their ―original expression,‖ but encourages others to build 
freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.
348
  If 
intellectual property law is to fulfill its utilitarian goal, laws should 
be narrowly tailored and ―should extend no further than necessary 
to protect incentives to innovate.‖349  If left unchecked, intellectual 
property laws may be more protective than necessary to achieve 
the stated goals, thereby impeding creative innovation.
350
 
In the case of music, the actual business practices of the music 
industry suggest that the underlying assumptions about robust 
intellectual property rights spurring innovation are not in fact being 
 
 345 Barnett, supra note 304, at 455. 
 346  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Craig W. Dallon, Original Intent and the Copyright 
Clause: Eldred v. Ashcroft Gets It Right, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 307, 317 (2006). 
 347 Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); see also Nash 
v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir. 1990) (―Copyright law does not protect hard 
work (divorced from expression), and hard work is not an essential ingredient of 
copyrightable expression . . . .‖).  
 348 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985). 
 349 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1581. 
 350 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1581. 
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borne out.
351
  In particular, the right to exclude seems to be used 
more as a weapon than as a tool of innovation.
352
  This, coupled 
with the rapid acceleration of technological advancement that 
allows for even more innovative and creative uses of existing 
copyrighted works inconceivable both to the early and recent 
drafters of copyright legislation, is grounds for a compelling 
argument that the existing copyright law is not only inadequate to 
honor its goal to promote innovation and creativity but in fact 
thwarts the very advancement and valuable social benefits of 
robust creativity and innovation borne out of a creative genre like 
hip hop.  Accordingly, Congress should act swiftly to provide clear 
guidance on how courts should address concerns raised by 
sampling in the music industry and reform music copyright to 
require all courts to apply traditional analyses of substantial 
similarity and de minimis use in sound recording infringement 
cases regardless of the jurisdiction in which the controversy arises. 
 
 351 See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Strategic Behaviors and Competition: 
Intangibles, Intellectual Property and Innovation (The Selected Works of Olufunmilayo 
B. Arewa, Working Paper, 2006) [hereinafter Strategic Behaviors], available at 
http://works.bepress.com/o_arewa/8 (unpublished paper cited with the permission of the 
author). 
 352 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 351, at 23. 
